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This thesis explores the post-1973 Middle East War arms procurement
policy of Egypt. In embarking upon a policy of arms diversification
shortly after that conflict, Egypt is seeking to end a 20 year period
of exclusive reliance on the Soviet Union as a source of military hard-
ware and training. Egypt is a unique case because she will face not
only the wide array of problems common to any nation seeking to change
the hardware and training base of its military forces from one source
to another, but an additional set of problems stemming from the fact
that she is one of the principal Arab confrontation states in the Middle
East. This thesis addresses the decline in Soviet/Egyptian relations
wliich led to the new arms procurement policy, the evolving status of
Egypt's military capability, and the technical problems to be overcome
in acquiring Western hardware and integrating that hardware into the
Egyptian force structure. It finally addresses the political issues
which will complicate the process of arms diversification. It concludes
that in the absence of significant pressure for a new war in the Middle
East, it will be possible for Egypt to rebuild its armed forces using
Western equipment, at the exclusion of the Soviet Union.
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I. EGYPTIAN ARMS DIVERSIFICATION :
IMPETUS AND PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
In March of 1976, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat went before the
People's Assembly of Egypt and, at the conclusion of a lengthy speech
on a variety of subjects, asked that the Assembly vote in favor of
abrogation of the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the
Soviet Union. President Sadat's wish was granted by an overwhelming
majority, and it appeared that, after a long period of strained rela-
tions with the USSR, Sadat had finally had enough, and decided to rid
himself of the Soviets once and for all. A major question for Western
policy-makers , however , is : If Egypt is free of Soviet influence , can
she remain that way indefinitely? The question is rooted in the fact
that Egypt is the most important confrontation state opposing Israel,
and is committed to recovering all its lost territory and securing the
rights of the Palestinians. Further, despite Sadat's apparent modera-
tion and acceptance of Israel's right to exist, it should not be lost
upon the West that Egypt is quite willing to go to war again in the
event that satisfactory progress is not made toward a Middle East peace
settlement in the near future. For war to be a plausible option, how-
ever, President Sadat must maintain Egypt's military capability at a
credible level, and herein is the crux of the problem. Despite Egypt's
approaches to the West for weapons 's systems, the vast majority of
Egypt's military equipment is still of Russian origin. By abrogating
the friendship treaty with the USSR, Sadat has apparently cut himself

off from further supplies of Soviet military equipment, and in the pro-
cess virtually guaranteed that his overall military capability will
decline over a period of time variously estimated at between five and
ten years. The decline can eventually be stemmed by the purchase of
sufficient quantities of military hardware from other sources, but the
key question is, can Eqypt acquire sufficient non-Soviet hardware, and
train its people to maintain and operate this equipment, before her
military capability reaches such a low ebb that the Egyptian military
command will no longer allow Sadat to pursue the policy?
The Egyptian Armed Forces, and particularly the officer corps,
remain the most powerful and effective interest group in Egyptian
society [Ref . 1, p. 3] ; if the officer corps becomes sufficiently dis-
enchanted with the status of Egypt's military capability, it is highly
probable that it will take whatever steps are necessary, including the
ouster of Sadat, to ensure adequate supplies of military hardware. The
purpose of this thesis is to examine the likelihood of success of the
current Egyptian policy of arms diversification, taking into account
both technical/hardware considerations and political considerations.
In order to examine the prospects for success of President Sadat's
current arms procurement policy, this chapter will trace Egypt's rela-
tions with the Soviet Union from the period of the July, 1972 ouster
of Soviet advisors from Egypt through the abrogation of the friendship
treaty and events of the ensuing six months; the primary vehicle for
this examination is speeches and interviews of President Sadat and
Foreign Minister Fahmi. This chapter will also introduce the problems
Egypt must face in switching from Russian to Western sources of arms
supply, as well as the principles and concepts which must be examined

in order to assess the prospects for success in switching arms suppliers.
Subsequent chapters will examine in detail Egypt's current military
capability, the problems of acquisition and integration of Western mili-
tary hardware, and introduce several political scenarios which could
impact differently on the success of arms diversification, with a view
toward drawing some conclusions about the likelihood of an eventual com-
plete changeover by Egypt to a Western-supplied military establishment.
B. EGYPT-USSR RELATIONS FROM MED- 19 7 2 TO THE PRESENT
Following the 1967 debacle in the Middle East, the Soviet Union under-
took a reassessment of its policy vis a vis Egypt, and displayed a
reluctance to provide Egypt with everything she sought in the military
domain. In the Soviet view, Egypt's armed forces had not absorbed all
the equipment already given to them; additionally, Moscow probably hoped
to avoid another war in the Middle East, as the 1967 war had proven dis-
astrous to the prestige of the USSR as a weapons supplier. The Soviets
felt that training was the answer, and from 1968 until mid-1972, Soviet
advisors and technicians penetrated virtually every segment of the
Egyptian military infrastructure. Soviet advisors were located at
Egyptian air and naval bases, military training facilities, and major
maintenance depots; they operated air defense facilities and SAM sites,
and infiltrated the Army down to the battalion and company level. The
Soviets even had some say in personnel matters such as promotions and
assignments within the Egyptian military [Ref. 2, p. 168]. Along with
the advisors, who numbered about 21,000 by the time of their ouster in
1972, the USSR did continue to introduce some new weapons into the Egypt-
ian inventory, and to build up Egypt's stock of existing weapons; during
the 1970-1971 time frame, such weapons as the FROG surface-to-surface
10

missile, SA- 3 SAM system, and ZSU-23-4- mobile anti-aircraft gun were in-
troduced, while additional TU-16 medium bombers, ME-6 helicopters, MiG-
21 fighter/attack aircraft, and SU-7 fighter bombers were delivered
[Ref. 2, p. 168], In exchange for all the technical assistance and
weapons deliveries, Moscow received extensive use of facilities at
Alexandria and Port Said, began development of a deepwater port at Mersa
Matruh, and was granted the right to base some Soviet aircraft in Egypt.
The 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was also part of the quid
pro quo for weapons and technical assistance.
Despite the apparent high level of Soviet assistance, (or in some
cases, because of it), President Sadat was not totally happy with the
USSR, and in July 1972 evicted virtually all the Soviet advisors and
technicians from Egypt, in the most significant open break with his
benefactor up to that point. The most important reasons were as follows:
[Ref. 2, p. 169, and Ref. 3, p. 35]
1. The continued no war, no peace situation along the front, and
the apparent lack of Soviet enthusiasm for changing the status quo in
the Middle East.
2. Perceived infringement by the Soviet advisors on Egyptian sover-
eignty, and arrogance in their dealing with the Egyptians they were
advising; these perceived insults to the dignity of the Arabs eventually
became intolerable.
3. Continued rebuff of Sadat's pleas for advanced weapons, such as
the MiG-23 variable geometry fighter. Despite what he was getting,
Sadat felt he required more, which the Soviets were unwilling to give.
4. A growing realization by the Egyptians that the Soviets were
technologically and culturally inferior to the United States, France,
11

the United Kingdom, and West Germany. It was also realized, in light
of this, that the most useful means of upgrading Egypt's pathetic
economy would be to apply Western technology, financed by Arab oil
money. As the majority of the Gulf oil states are conservative monar-
chies and staunchy anti-Soviet, Sadat probably felt that putting some
distance between himself and the USSR would help to free up both the
importation of the technology and the money.
5. A feeling by President Sadat that the Soviet Union had been
behind the perceived 1971 attempt of Ali Sabri and others to remove
him from power.
6. One final reason for the ouster became apparent after the
October 1973 war with Israel, namely, that President Sadat wanted to
whole world to know that the war with Israel was planned and executed
100 percent by Arab minds; this would only be possible if the Soviet
advisors were removed from the scene.
Despite the ouster of the Soviet advisors, Soviet weapons continued
to arrive in Egypt, including such new systems as the SA-6 and SA-7
SAM systems and the SU-20 aircraft. The weapons may not have repre-
sented everything that Sadat wanted; nevertheless, he felt he had suffi-
cient weapons with which to go to war on 6 October 1973. During the
war, the Soviets resupplied Egypt with over 100 aircraft (including
35-40 "Super" MiG-21's), 600 T-62 and T-55 tanks, and equipment for 30
SA-3 and SA-6 batteries. However, the USSR insisted on hard cash pay-
ment, which was provided by Algeria, Libya, and the oil states [Ref. 2,
p. 170] . It may be the fact that payment was demanded which explains
President Sadat's continued assertion that the USSR has not replaced
his wartime losses, but has merely fulfilled some previously signed
12

contracts. It mast be pointed out that it is President Sadat's percep-
tion of events which is the key to understanding his actions, and not
the perceptions of Westerners, Soviets, or anyone else.
The perceived failure of the Soviet Union to compensate Egypt for
its Yom Kippur War losses led to the next significant step in Presi-
dent Sadat's drift out of the Soviet orbit, his speech of 18 April 1974
announcing his policy of diversification of sources of arms supply.
He said that the Soviet Union had responded to only two of four messages
he had sent to Leonid I. Brezhnev between October 1973 - April 1973,
and that the responses had merely stated that his requests were under
study [Ref. 4, p. 1]. Therefore, he decided to end his total reliance
on the Soviet Union as an arms supplier. He subsequently acknowledged,
in an interview in his home, that it would take several years to re-
train troops to handle new equipment [Ref. 5, p. 1], Additionally,
although highly critical of the Soviet Union, he stated that "Egypt
does not want to be friendly with the United States at the Soviet
Union's expense, or vice versa", [Ref. 4, p. 1] a clear indication that
he did not desire a total break with the USSR.
One immediate impact of Sadat's speech was a total embargo on mili-
tary shipments from the USSR. The alleged failure of the USSR to com-
pensate Egypt for losses of the October war, as well as its failure to
provide Egypt with other sophisticated military hardware she desires,
is a recurring theme of President Sadat in speeches and statements from
early 1974 onward. A second theme which began to appear in late 1974
was the failure of the USSR to reschedule Egypt's military debt. Because
of President Sadat's desire to rebuild and strengthen the Egyptian
economy in the aftermath of the October war, Egypt is seeking a ten year
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moratorium on debt repayments, followed by a stretching out of the debt
over a period of 30-M-O years (the debt under discussion is primarily
that incurred by Egypt as a result of the 1967 war). A number of state-
ments by the President point out that the USSR has made only token pay-
ments on its World War II debt to the United States, and therefore
should have no objection to rescheduling Egypt's wartime debts. This
the USSR has refused thus far to do; talks on debt rescheduling in
November 1975 ended in deadlock, because the USSR would not move from
its position of no moratorium on payments and a 20 year repayment period.
The failure of the Soviets to grant concessions on the debt repayment
is attributed to Moscow's displeasure over President Sadat's rapproch-
ment with the West and his attempt to diversify his sources of arms
[Ref. 6, p. D-l].
A third factor imposing strain on Egyptian/Soviet relations became
operative in late 1975, in the aftermath of the signing of the second
Sinai agreement between Israel and Egypt. Statements by the USSR and
Syria following the signing of the agreement were highly critical of
President Sadat. In Sadat's view, the Russians and the Syrians (under
goading by the USSR) were attacking Sadat personally and accusing him
of abandoning the struggle against Israel. The President contended that
this simply was not true, that the second Sinai agreement was definitely
in Egypt's interest, but that signing it did not mean abandonment of
the struggle to recover al] occupied territories and secure the rights
of the Palestinians. Statements and Egyptian press reports in November
/December 1975 express inability to understand the Soviet attitude, and
bespeak a pessimistic view of the potential of Soviet output toward
peace in the Middle East [Ref. 7, p. D4CM+5].
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Despite the consistently reiterated differences over military supply
and debt rescheduling, Egyptian/Soviet relations through the end of
1975 maintained a low profile equilibrium of sorts. There were even
occasional signs of improvement, such as the early 1975 resumption of
some Soviet military deliveries to Egypt, most notably the first of some
48 MiG-23's to be delivered that year. Deliveries were not sufficient
to meet Sadat's perceived requirements, however, and the final blow was
struck when the USSR refused India permission in early 1976 to provide
Egypt with some desperately required spare parts for MiG-21's, the back-
bone of Egypt's Air Force. The President had alluded previously to the
possibility of abrogating the friendship treaty with the USSR [Ref. 8,
p. 76] , and the India spare parts episode was the final straw which
prompted him to take this momentous step. The abrogation speech included
the assertion that in 18 months his armed forces would be just so much
scrap iron, implying that he felt this step would result in the total
cutoff of even the then-existing trickle of spare parts and equipment
from the USSR.
The abrogation of the friendship treaty was hailed in the West as
the most significant step in the gradual but constant demise of the
relationship between the USSR and Egypt, and as an indication that per-
haps Soviet influence in Egypt could be totally extinguished. It is
noteworthy, however, that recent statements of President Sadat do not
differ significantly in content from those made prior to the abrogation
of the treaty. Most statements made up through the end of 1975 contained
words to the effect that Egypt was still open to the USSR, if the Soviets
would accept Egypt's independent stance in Middle Eastern affairs and
not try to influence Egyptian policy as a quid pro quo for arms shipments,
15

It is true that Sadat's statements and press reports immediately
following the abrogation announcement did not contain the usual carrot,
Additionally, following a visit by Vice President Husni Mubarak to the
PRC, the Egyptian press gave extremely laudatory coverage to the new
Egyptian/PRC rapprochment [Ref. 9, p. D-l] in a move that was probably
designed to raise the ire of the USSR. Beginning in late April 1976,
however, the carrot began to appear again; the most recent theme in
Sadat's approach to the USSR is exemplified by the following quotation
from a speech before a joint meeting of the ASU Central Committee and
the People's Assembly on 22 July:
"to the extent that the Soviet Union is ready to pursue an open
policy which rids itself of the complexes and negativism of the
past, Egypt will be prepared to respond to the Soviet Union and
to establish bridges again" [Ref. 10, p. D1-D27. See also FBIS
Middle East reports 30 April, 3 May, and 14 June 1976.]
The criticism of the USSR is still present, and is now being uttered
in the same breath as the willingness to improve relations, but the
implication is clear: despite the seemingly irreversible step of
abrogating the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, President Sadat
does not appear to have totally burned his bridges with the USSR, and
holds out seme hope of a rapprochment, albeit on his own terms.
C. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ARMS
The foregoing has traced the development of Egyptian/Soviet rela-
tions from mid-1972 to the recent past. Paralleling the worsening of
relations between the two countries has been a concerted effort on the
part of Egypt to obtain sophisticated weapons systems from alternate
sources of supply. In its effort to maintain a credible military capa-
bility, Egypt is currently pursuing a wide variety of approaches.
First, using Arab oil money, she is seeking to buy weapons systems,
i a.

such as aircraft, helicopters, SAM missile systems, and tanks, to name
a few, from Great Britain, France, and lately, the United States.
Second, Egypt is negotiating with Great Britain and France for the con-
struction of an indigenous Arab arms production industry at currently
existing facilities in Egypt; the Arab Committee for Military Industri-
alization (composed of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirantes,
and Egypt) will put up the funds, while the European nations will supply
the necessary technological expertise to get the industry going. First
priority of this industry is to be the production of aircraft (building
the French Mirage F.l under license is one of the possibilities under
discussion) and missiles, with eventual branching out into other areas
planned in the future [Ref . 11, p. 18] . Third, Egypt is seeking to up-
grade the capability and extend the life of existing Soviet equipment
by replacing certain components with Western equipment; re-engining
Soviet MiG-21's with British engines was one such plan under discussion.
D. IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING SUPPLIERS
All of these plans, if they come to fruition, will certainly result
in an eventual changeover to a Western supplied Egyptian military. The
key question is, how long will it take, and how much will Egyptian mili-
tary capability decline during the process. President Sadat acknow-
ledged, in commenting on a Jordanian plan to buy some Russian SAM's,
that it took Egypt over seven years to change over from Western to
Soviet arms in 1955. It must be realized, too, that weapons systems
are considerably more complex today than in 1955-1962, implying that
the changeover will take even longer in the modern era. A number of




First, the weapons supply capability of the potential supplier na-
tion must be examined. It is all well and good, for example for Egypt
to conclude a contract for 200 Mirage F.l aircraft with France, or 500
Chieftain Tanks with Great Britain ( these are hypothetical figures )
,
but these weapons do not impact at all on Egypt's military capability
until they actually are delivered. Given the low rates of production
in the United States, let alone Western Europe, it could be a very long
time indeed before these weapons actually materialize. Meanwhile, the
operational capability of Soviet hardware will continue to erode,
forcing such measures as curtailment of training and cannibalization
of certain equipment to keep front line units operational [Ref. 12,
p. 11].
Secondly, the new weapons systems do not represent equivalent mili-
tary capability until the personnel who operate them are as proficient
on the new equipment as they were on the old. It is one thing to teach
a MiG-21 pilot to fly a French Mirage; it is quite another for that
pilot to attain the absolute level of proficiency in the Mirage that he
had in the Soviet aircraft, so he will react automatically under the
stress of combat in a manner likely to maximize his chances of survival,
This variable is obviously weapons system dependent; it is probably
more difficult by several orders of magnitude to switch from one air-
craft to another than to learn how to operate a new SAM system at
maximum efficiency.
Thirdly, and related to the above, is the question of the impact
of new weapons systems on tactical doctrine. There is a feeling in
some circles that weapons are produced for the purpose of implementing
a specific military doctrine, with the corollary that a weapon is of
little utility in the application of some other doctrine. If the
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converse is also taken as true, i.e. that a given doctrine (that is,
in this case, Soviet doctrine emphasizing size and numbers of weapons)
is of little value in employing weapons not designed for the implemen-
tation of that doctrine, then Egypt will have to face the additional
burden of retraining its personnel in the employment of the new Western
weapons, as well as their mere operation.
A fourth factor impacting on the changeover timetable deals with
the problem of establishing an adequate logistics system to support the
weapons system. Logistics support is greatly simplified if all of a
nation's fighter aircraft, for example, are from one source; it is
simplified even more if all the aircraft are the same type. One can
imagine a wide variety of scenarios wherein parts destined for a given
base , flying a given type of aircraft
,
get misrouted • to a different
base having a totally different type of aircraft; in a combat situation
the results of such an error could be disastrous. Developing adequate
measures to avoid such errors is a major problem that Egypt will face
in changing and diversifying its sources of arms supply.
E. THE PROSPECTS
If Egypt existed in a vacuum there is no question that eventually,
over a period of time, she could completely convert her military to
Western sources of weapons. However, she does not exist in a vacuum;
Egypt is the most populous and most important of the confrontation
states arrayed against Israel, and feels she must have a credible mili-
tary option if she is to have any hope of regaining her lost territory.
Thus, the difficulties in changing sources of supply are likely to be
exacerbated or ameliorated by political considerations in the Middle
East. Certain conditions might lessen tensions in the area, thereby
19

reducing pressure on Sadat to re-open the "Soviet connection" , while
certain other conditions might have just the opposite effect. The con-
cluding chapter will examine several possible scenarios and assess
their likely impact on Egypt's arms procurement policy. This chapter
will then bring together all the aspects of the arms changeover process
- hardware, personnel, and political - with a view toward assessing the
likelihood of Egypt's maintaining a credible military force in the face
of all the difficulties described. Egypt is beset by a greater variety
of problems of greater severity than any other nation in the Middle
East; if it appears that she can effect such a dramatic changeover, the
implication is that other Arab nations now dependent on the Soviet Union
for arms could also be wooed over the West.
20

II. EGYPT'S PRESENT MILITARY CAPABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine Egyptian military capability as it has
evolved since the October 1973 War and the subsequent announcement of
the policy of arms diversification in April 1974. In addition to
looking at numbers of major hardware items currently on hand in the
Egyptian Armed Forces (including the few items of Western equipment
which have been received to date ) , this analysis will attempt to look
at such factors as age of the equipment, current levels of training
within the Egyptian military, and likely combat readiness of major
items of military hardware. The analysis will show to what extent
Egypt's capability has declined since the initiation of the new policy,
not only in absolute terms, but also relative to the military capa-
bility of Israel. The focus of this analysis will be on major weapon
systems deemed most important to the mission of resuming hostilities
with Israel should that option become desirable or necessary to Egypt.
Making the assumption that future hostilities will rely heavily on
weapons assessed to have had the most impact on the 1973 war, these
weapon systems include combat aircraft, tanks, missile systems (surface-
to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air), and Naval vessels/weapon
systems. It is realized that total military capability is comprised
of much more than just these highly visible and expensive items, but
it is these systems which will cause the most significant difficulty in
converting from one source of supply to another. Similarly, it is
21

these systems which are the most sensitive to degradation in capability
/performance due to the lack of adequate maintenance and training.
Finally, these types of weapons are manufactured by the smallest number
of prospective supplier nations, making them potentially the most diffi-
cult for Egypt to replace from sources outside the USSR.
B. EGYPT'S CURRENT CAPABILITY - THE DEBATE
The precise status of Egypt's current military capability is a
matter of some debate. Central to the debate is imprecise knowledge
of the exact status of Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union, and,
more specifically, the degree to which the Armed Forces are or are not
receiving spare parts for the Soviet equipment in the inventory. On
one side of the debate are those who feel that Egyptian military capa-
bility has declined seriously since the October 1973 War, due to the
fact that spare parts to maintain and overhaul major equipment items
have in fact been reduced to insignificant levels. (See for example
Ref. 12, Ch. II.) The essence of this view is that President Sadat
has been telling the truth about his relationship with the Soviet Union,
and that Soviet support for Egyptian military equipment has been reduced
to virtually nothing. As a result of the drying up of the flow of
spare parts and replacement equipment, Soviet-made armor and aircraft
are seriously overdue for overhaul, training has been reduced to levels
insufficient to maintain combat readiness, and the Armed Forces have
been forced to resort to cannibalization to maintain some of the equip-
ment in working order.
Roger Pajak has espoused this view in a number of articles on the
subject and in a February 1977 interview with this author.
22

The opposite view of Egypt's capability derives from the belief that
Soviet/Egyptian relations are not as poor as President Sadat would have
the world believe. While neintaining a low profile vis-a-vis Egypt,
the Soviet Union has been quietly supporting the Egyptian military with
spare parts and equipment, both by direct shipment and via intermediaries
such as Yugoslavia, North Korea, and Czechoslovakia. These shipments
have enabled Egypt to conduct military training and exercises at rates
comparable to those observed prior to the October 1973 War [Ref. 13, p.A7]
Perhaps the most ardent supporter of this second view of Egypt's
military capability is Dr. Uri Ra'anan of the International Security
Studies Committee of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy , Tufts
University. Dr. Ra'anan's basic view is that, despite the ups and downs
of the Soviet/Egyptian relationship over the years, the Soviet supply
line to Egypt cannot dry up because Egypt simply cannot afford to let
it do so. The line of reasoning, expressed in a prepared statement in
hearings before the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Commitee on 31 March 1976, is as follows; the military,
and more specifically, the officer corps, constitutes the power base
for Egypt's civilian government. To alienate this power base, by tak-
ing steps which would impede the supply lines supporting Egypt's mili-
tary capability, would be foolhardy. The West cannot substitute for the
USSR in supplying military hardware for two fundamental reasons. First,
Western nations cannot supply the quantities of armaments needed in
time to reequip the Egyptian Armed Forces. Second, Ra'anan asserts
that weapons are designed to be employed in a specific doctrinal context;
because Egyptian military forces are trained in Soviet doctrine, Western
weapons, designed for the implementation of different doctrines would be
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of little utility to the Egyptian Armed Forces. For these reasons,
the only option open to Egypt, if she is to maintain a credible mili-
tary force, is a continued supply of Soviet military equipment.
Ra'anan cites two quotes from President Sadat which testify to his ap-
parent recognition of these facts [Ref. 14-
,
p. 58, 59], and concludes
that whatever efforts the Egyptian President is making to obtain
Western military equipment are being made only to add Western technology
to the Egyptian Armed Forces, and not to replace the Soviet Union as
the principal armorer of Egypt. He later cites figures which are de-
signed to show that, despite the apparent seriousness of postwar rift
between Egypt and the USSR, Soviet military hardware of many different
types has continued to flow into Egypt in significant quantities. He
warns that the West not be deceived by the apparent poor state of
Soviet/Egyptian relations. His implied conclusion is that the Egyptian
Armed Forces are not in nearly the desperate straits that the massive
search for Western arms would lead one to believe [Ref. 1M-, p. 68],
C. ASSESSING EGYPT'S MILITARY CAPABILITY
- WEAPONS INVENTORIES
The true status of the Egyptian Armed Forces in early 1977 is be-
lieved to lie somewhere between the two extremes articulated above.
It can be said with virtual certainty that the current capability of
those Armed Forces is not equal to that of the highly trained, finely
tuned military machine which initiated the Yom Kippur War on 6 October
1973. What is extremely difficult to quantify is the degree to which
that capability has declined; is the decline significant, or only
marginal? In attempting to answer this question, the state of the
Egyptian military capability existing prior to the 1973 war will be
oa.

used as the baseline. The rationale for selecting this period as the
baseline is that it represents a theoretical maximum capability which
can be attained using Soviet hardware and Soviet training. Although
nearly all Soviet advisors had been ousted from Egypt 15 months prior
to the start of the war, the efficiency with which the Egyptian Armed
Forces operated in the opening days of the war demonstrated a high de-
gree of personnel and materiel readiness, brought about by constant
training prior to the war and the highest possible degree of Soviet
logistic support. Thus, under any circumstances other than this level
of logistic support, it is argued that Egypt's military capability must
decline by some finite amount as a result of the inability to properly
maintain equipment and the inability to conduct sufficient training to
maintain a high state of combat readiness among the Armed Forces
personnel. This decline in capability will result even if the orders
of battle (that is, the numerical inventories) for major weapons/weapon
systems are the same or higher than those existing prior to the October
War. Although orders of battle in themselves give little real indica-
tion of military capability, they are the logical starting point for
assessing the direction in which that capability has evolved.
Before making an analysis of the orders of battle for major Egyptian
weapons/weapon systems, it is necessary to articulate the difficulties
which one faces in attempting to do the analysis from open source litera-
ture. The first problem is a very real uncertainty about the exact
quantities of weapons the USSR has delivered to Egypt, especially low




Egypt's exact wartime losses , makes it very difficult to ascertain
the current quantity of various armaments in the Egyptian inventory.
A second problem is lack of agreement among sources over the number
of weapons comprising a particular inventory. For example, the Inter-
national Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance 1976/
1977 carries 50 MiG-17 fighter-bombers and no MiG-19 aircraft among
Egypt's front-line Air Force inventory, while another authoritative
source puts the numbers of these aircraft at 125 and 45, respectively
[Ref. 15, p. 1653]. In reconciling ambiguities of this type, this
analysis will utilize IISS figures unless the preponderance of other
evidence suggests that these figures are in error.
A third problem impacting on this assessment is ambiguity in format
of some of the sources. For example, in the air defense system area,
the IISS Military Balances for 1972/1973, 1973/1974, and 1974/1975
give figures for the number of surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites
established in Egypt. By contrast, The Military Balance 1976/1977
lists figures which are apparently numbers of launchers for the various
SAM's in the inventory, or possibly the numbers of missiles themselves.
With these considerations in mind, the following table (table I)
represents the best estimate of Egyptian major weapon system inventories
existing just prior to the October 1973 War, and as of 1 January 1977.
Unless otherwise noted, the data are taken from the IISS Military
Balance . Considerations governing the choice of weapons for inclusion
in the table have already been discussed (see page 21).
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Outright losses of tanks, aircraft, etc may be known with reasonable
certainty, but losses due to the unserviceability of weapons which
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1. T-34 tanks were not used in the normal armor mode, but were dug in
in static emplacements as supplementary artillery [Ref. 16, p. 370],
2. 200 AMX-30 tanks ordered in January 1975 have probably been
delivered as of early 1977 [Ref. 17, p. 10].
3. Ref. 18, p. 45.
4. Ref. 18, p. 44. Current numbers are estimated to be somewhat less
than pre-October 1973 levels due to lack of replacements and expendi-
tures during the War.
5. Based on the total number of MiG-21's delivered' since this aircraft
first appeared in Egypt in 1962, and losses of about 200 between the
1967 and 1973 wars, total number is probably well in excess of 200. 200
to 250 is the consensus view of the number of operational aircraft in
the inventory. Current inventory consists mainly of MiG-21M and MiG-2MF
variants of this aircraft. Extra aircraft are in storage, and are
probably being cannibalized to keep 200 operational.
6. Ref. 19, p. 907. The aircraft are divided among 24 air superiority
fighter versions and 24 ground attack versions.
7. Current figure of 120 includes an unknown number (under 25) of
swing-wing SU-20's delivered in 1972 [Ref. 18, p. 44].
8. The order for 44 Mirage F.l's reported by IISS was never finalized
into a firm contract [Ref. 20, p. 51]. The 20 Mirage F.l's carried in
this table are the result of a Kuwaiti order in Egypt's behalf in late
1973/early 1974 [Ref. 21, p. 16].
9. The Gazelle helicopters for Egypt were reported nearing completion
in early 1976, and deliveries being taken as of January 1977. The
total of 42 should be in Egypt at present [Ref. 22, p. 16].
10. The pre-October 1973 figures for SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 were
taken from Ref. 18, p. 44. The number of SAM sites pre-October 1973
was approximately 130. There are no reliable figures on the current
number of SAM sites, but it is believed to be essentially the same.
11. Some Crotale mobile low-altitude SAM launchers were reportedly
being delivered to Egypt as of early 1977 in fulfillment of earlier
contracts [Ref. 22, p. 16],
12. Source: Janes Fighting Ships, 1976/1977 [Ref. 23, p. 134-138].
IISS Military Balance 1973/1974 does not account for one Komar sunk by
Israeli aircraft in 1970. This error is carried over into 1976/1977
figures, which should reflect 4 vice 5 Komar' s.
13. Egyptian Komars are indigenously built missile boats sjjnilar to
Soviet Komar class. Currently unarmed [Ref. 23, p. 137].
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The table of equipment inventories shows a mixed picture of Egyptian
military capability based on numbers. The Army appears to be in rela-
tively good shape in terms of tanks and APC's. The Frog rockets are of
short range and questionable accuracy, and did not have significant im-
pact in the 1973 War, so the numbers here are of little import. The
use of the long range Scud was threatened but never implemented in that
war [Ref. 16, p. 411-412], and its numbers have probably remained static.
In anti-tank missiles , one of the most significant new weapons of the
war, current figures are not known, but are presumably considerably
lower than prior to the war; a shortage of these weapons may be inferred
from the fact that a deal for the British Swingfire anti-tank missile is
one of Egypt's first Western procurement efforts to come to fruition
(the next chapter details these efforts).
The Egyptian Air Force (EAF) , at least in terms of numbers of air-
craft, appears to be in somewhat better shape than at the beginning of
the war. There is considerable ambiguity over its present capability,
however, which will be addressed in the next section of this chapter.
The Egyptian Air Defense Forces (EADF) appear to be down in terns
of the numbers of missiles available. Uncertainty about the true size
of the Soviet wartime airlift clouds the picture of missile strength,
but the EADF Commander, Major General Helmy Afifi, asserted in July
1975 that Egypt had received no missile replacements whatsoever since
the end of the October War [Ref. 24, p. 15]. Ongoing negotiations for
British and French low-level air defense missile systems (Rapier and
Crotale, respectively) suggest that the missile shortage is most crit-
ical in this area. Significantly, it was the low level SA-6 which was
among the most effective elements of the Egyptian air defense system.
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The Egyptian Navy played a relatively insignificant role in the Oc-
tober 1973 war, when its Osa and Komar missile boats were completely
outmatched by Israeli Gabriel-armed Saar and Reshef missile boats.
Egypt's other naval units played virtually no role at all. Nonetheless,
with better naval craft Egypt's Navy could play a potentially signifi-
cant part in a future war. Egyptian Naval strength is virtually identi-
cal to that existing prior to the war, except in the missile boat area.
The major conclusion which can be drawn from the above analysis is
that, quantitatively at least, the Egyptian Armed Forces appear to be
approximately equal to what they were in October 1973. The major
shortages in terms of equipment appear to be in the air defense and
anti-tank missile areas.
D. ASSESSING EGYPT'S MILITARY CAPABILITY: OTHER FACTORS
Given that the numbers are essentially equal, any degradation in
military capability logically derives from two distinct but interrelated
factors: insufficient capability to maintain that equipment in a high
state of combat readiness, and inability to conduct sufficient train-
ing to maintain the combat readiness of Armed Forces personnel. Both
these factors are linked to a third factor which is very difficult to
measure, where the Soviet Union is concerned: the flow of spare parts
and other support equipment. This support becomes more critical as
N equipment ages; the longer an item such as a tank or an aircraft goes
between overhauls, the more likely it is to break down completely,
thereby necessitating replacement.
In analyzing the equipment and personnel readiness of the Egyptian
Armed Forces today, it is useful to look again at the pre-war period,
making the assumption that this period represented a high point in
Soviet support to a Third World client. There is general agreement

among sources that the Soviet Union transferred massive amounts of mili-
tary hardware to Egypt during the two years preceding the October War
[Ref. 18, p. 43-46, for example]. Thus, on the surface, Egypt received
the raw materials for a very effective, well supported military force.
A study by Lewis Snider [Ref. 25, p. 8-10], however, noted two apparent
characteristics of Soviet supply relationships which suggest otherwise.
One is that Soviet supply patterns, training programs, manipulation of
spare parts shipments, and reluctance to supply certain offensive weap-
ons Egypt wanted indicated a reluctance to arm its Arab clients to
launch an all-out war against Israel (see also Ref. 16, p. 54-57). Re-
lated to this is the notion that the Soviet Union makes arms transfers
more for the purpose of demonstrating a strong political commitment
than for the purpose of appreciably upgrading a client's military capa-
bility; the refusal to supply offensive weapons desired by Sadat lends
support to this notion. Leaving aside comparative capabilities of the
weapons themselves (Soviet versus Western), these patterns of Soviet
supply suggest that maintenance support for Soviet weapon systems is
minimal, even during the best of times. This follows logically from
the fact that Soviet maintenance doctrine places little emphasis on field
repair, emphasizing instead replacement of entire tanks or tank units
on the battlefield, and repair of damaged equipment later on at the
battalion level. For example, an Egyptian officer commenting on the
inferiority of Soviet spares/logistic support, stated that it is often
easier to get an entire new tank from the Russians than spares to fix
an old one [Ref. 26, p. 462]. This maintenance problem is exacerbated
by a feeling on the part of senior Egyptian commanders that Soviet
equipment is unnecessarily complicated and technologically backward
[Ref. 27, p. 43].
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Against this background, it is difficult to give credence to reports
that Egypt's military capability approaches what it was prior to the war,
even if the numbers of weapons/weapon systems are essentially equivalent.
The Egyptians maintain that Soviet supplies of spare parts have been
virtually nonexistent since the 1973 war, and particularly since the end
of 1975, when Egypt signed the second Sinai Agreement. Even if Israeli
intelligence reports that spare parts supplies are continuing are true,
it is highly unlikely that they are at a level anything like that exist-
ing before the war. Within the Air Force, for example, the shortage of
spare parts to maintain aircraft forced a reduction in flight training
hours from 20 to 15 per month per pilot in mid-1975, and necessitated a
major engineering effort to design and manufacture spare parts to keep
the aircraft combat ready [Ref. 28, p. 12]. An "authoritative estimate"
in mid-19 7 5 indicated that pilot losses in training crashes since the
war had been almost as numerous as those sustained during the war [Ref.
29, p. 4-]. This points to both a degradation in pilot skill and a
higher rate of aircraft failure, brought about by inadequate maintenance.
Lack of spares was also one of the reasons cited by EAF commanders for
investigating with Rolls Royce the possibility of re-engining Egypt's
MiG-21's with British engines [Ref. 30, p. 20], A desire to completely
re-engine the aircraft suggests that, even if sufficient spares are
available to keep the aircraft marginally operable, the engines are
seriously past due for the complete overhauls needed to keep them fully
combat ready and dependable in any contingency.
The overall picture that emerges, then, is one of apparent quanti-
tative sufficiency in most areas, with equipment capability being
slowly but continually degraded by inadequate repair and maintenance.
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How long the Soviet equipment will remain combat worthy is open to ques-
tion. President Sadat's assertion in early 1976 that his Armed Forces
would be reduced to scrap iron in 12 to 18 months is clearly an over-
statement, but Egypt's massive efforts over the last two and one-half
years to acquire Western military hardware bespeaks a growing concern
over the present capability to pose a credible military threat to
Israel. The credibility of the threat to Israel is further reduced by
the fact that Israel is quantitatively stronger in virtually all areas
than she was prior to the war , conducts vigorous training to maintain a
high state of combat readiness, and is scheduled to receive even more
sophisticated weapon systems such as the F-15 multi-purpose fighter
aircraft. Egypt can manufacture some spare parts for its equipment,
acquire some spares from other nations (notably Yugoslavia) which
operate Soviet equipment, and cannibalize older items in the inventory
to keep front-line forces in an adequate state of readiness, but these
are only stopgap measures. They do not address the basic problem,
which is the aging of equipment in the inventory. With the exception
of Egypt's MiG-23 fighter-bombers and possibly some of her T-62 tanks,
all the equipment is of 1973 vintage or older. Inasmuch as the USSR
has had the capability to ship from on-hand stocks rather than right
off the production line, some of the equipment may be a good deal older
than its apparent age based on delivery time in Egypt. Thus, advanc-
ing age is compounding the problems brought about by inadequate main-
tenance and training.
All the factors cited above point to a continuing decline in mili-
tary capability, a decline which will not be reversed until either a
full scale military supply relationship is reestablished with the USSR,
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or until some of the hardware sought from the West enters the Egyptian
inventory. President Sadat appears to have cast his lot firmly with
the West. The next chapter addresses Egypt's Western procurement
efforts, and their likely effect on Egypt's military capability.
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III. THE PROCESS OF ARMS DIVERSIFICATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will review in depth Egypt's ongoing efforts to imple-
ment the policy of arms diversification, and thereby reverse the trend
of declining military capability. These efforts include the retrofit-
ting of existing Soviet hardware with improved Western components,
direct procurement of entire new Western weapons/weapon systems, and
attempts to establish an indigenous Arab Arms Industry based on the li-
cense production of Western equipment. All these efforts have varying
potential for reversing the decline in Egyptian military capability;
this analysis will attempt to assess that potential, as well as the
problems inherent in each of these types of efforts. The focus here
is on hardware aspects of the capabilities problem; the analysis will
look at the items of equipment being sought and the probable timespans
required for their acquisition. The next chapter will examine the
problems to be overcome in integrating the new equipment into the
Egyptian force structure.
B. THE MOTIVE FOR DIVERSIFYING
President Sadat and his senior military commanders have often stated
that the motive behind the policy of arms diversification is to ensure
that Egypt is never again dependent upon a single source of supply for
all of its military equipment. It is readily apparent that arms diversi-
fication will lessen Egypt's former total dependence on the USSR. How-
ever, one is still left with the question of the ultimate scope of the
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policy. As with the question of Egypt's current military capability,
there are two views regarding this particular question. To a large
extent, the view one takes is dependent upon one's view of the status
of the current Soviet/Egyptian relationship and one's view of Egypt's
current military capability. One view is that the policy of diver-
sification is designed primarily to put into Egyptian hands the Western
technology currently possessed by Israel. The Egyptians have sought
sophisticated Western weapons in order to better enable them to combat
the technologically superior equipment possessed by the Israelis. It
is argued that doctrinal and Western production capability constraints
would make a complete reequipping of the Egyptian Armed Forces a pro-
hibitively long term venture. These considerations do not, however,
prohibit the acquisition of some items of equipment, as long as they
are confined to "essentially marginal categories, that can be isolated
from the mainstream of Egyptian logistics..." [Ref. 14, p. 58]; such
items as a few squadrons of fighters, trucks, electronic equipment,
etc are placed in this category. It is concluded that these efforts,
which are expected to continue, do not imply a desire to replace the
Soviet Union as the main Egyptian arms supplier. Rather, they are de-
signed to strengthen pro-Egyptian sentiment in countries where public
sympathy has tended to favor Israel, and also to acquire Western tech-
nology in order to better combat Israel [Ref. 14, p. 59].
Central to this argument is the contention that the current Egyptian
/Soviet rift is not nearly as deep as it would appear on the surface.
The opposing view is that this rift is in fact the most serious in a
long series of Soviet/Egyptian disagreements, and that Egypt has been,
if not totally cut off, then almost totally cut off from any significant
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level of Soviet support. If this is the case, then Egypt has no alter-
native but to commit herself to the long term replacement of Soviet
with Western equipment. There is no question that one of the motiva-
tions behind the diversification of arms sources is_ the acquisition of
superior Western technology. Egyptian military officials have expressed
the view that, while Soviet equipment is rugged and serviceable, it is
also overcomplicated and technologically backward, and Egypt cannot
hope to compete with Israel's Western technology even if the Russians
supply their latest equipment [Ref . 31, p. 7] . This would suggest that
the acquisition of some Western technology in a few areas would be of
limited value were it Egypt's aim to continue relying on the Soviet
Union as its main arms supplier. The wide range of Egypt's Western pro-
curement efforts, as well as the sheer size of some of the potential
acquisitions suggests strongly that Egypt is committed to a long term
effort to completely reequip her military, and not just acquire a few
items of hardware on the margins. Thus, despite the acknowledged diffi-
culties involved (which will become more apparent in the remainder of
this and the following chapter) , it is the conclusion of this author
that Egypt's ultimate aim in arms diversification is to eventually re-
equip its military forces entirely with Western hardware, while taking
whatever steps are necessary to extend the life of the Soviet weapons
currently in the inventory. The following analysis will examine the
entire range of Egypt's diversification efforts, highlight the problems
which have been and are impacting on those efforts, and calculate,
where possible, the likely time frame during which the sought after
items will enter the Egyptian inventory.
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C. UPGRADING MILITARY CAPABILITY THROUGH
DIVERSIFICATION: THREE ALTERNATIVES
1. Alternative I - Retrofit of Existing Equipment
Proposals to retrofit existing Soviet equipment with improved
Western components have been evident in all branches of the Egyptian
Armed Forces except the Air Defense Forces (and efforts within the Air
Force would impact indirectly on the Air Defense Forces). This approach
to weapons diversification appears to stem from three underlying reasons
.
First, in some instances the proposed retrofits are designed to replace
components which are simply wearing out. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union
has apparently ceased to do engine overhauls, for example, the Western
components will prolong the life of Soviet equipment which is basically
serviceable in respects other than those related to the replaced com-
ponent.
The second apparent reason for the retrofit approach is to up-
grade the capabilities of weapons or weapon systems to a level beyond
that achievable with totally Soviet components. The already mentioned
feeling on the relative backwardness of Soviet technology is the
driving factor in the desire to replace certain equipment components,
even if the existing ones are basically sound.
A third reason to retrofit, rather than replace, is that the
former option is considerably less expensive than the latter. As will
be seen later in this thesis, economic considerations have had a very
significant impact in limiting the success of Egypt's arms diversifica-
tion policy to date; hence the desirability of a less expensive
approach such as retrofit.
The following paragraphs describe Egypt's efforts to have some
of its Soviet equipment retrofitted. By and large, these efforts have .
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met with little success thus far, and they appear to hold little promise
for the future.
a. Army
The only major effort toward retrofitting Army equipment is
directed at upgrading the capability of Egypt's approximately 2000
Soviet tanks. Information on these negotiations has been very sparse,
but discussions were underway with Italy in early 1976 on a plan to re-
gun Egypt's T-62 tanks, and with Great Britain to rebuild her 1100 T-54-
/55 tanks with new engines and 105mm main guns (London Times article
cited in Ref. 14, p. 80). There is no indication that these negotiations
have resulted in any contracts, and this sort of retrofit is of dubious
value anyway in that it fails to address the major deficiencies of
Soviet tanks in the desert warfare setting. Soviet tanks
,
particularly
the T-62, rate highly in mobility and firepower, but they lack the
sophisticated ranging devices available on U.K. and U.S. tanks. Addi-
tionally, Soviet tank gun barrels can depress only four degrees below
horizontal, compared with ten degrees for most Western tanks (see Ref.
16, THE TANK BATTLE following page 370 for a discussion of tank
characteristics applicable to desert warfare). Regunning the tanks,
without a major modification to the turrets and the addition of better
rangefinders seems of little value in improving the capability of Egypt's
armored forces. Replacing the engines may have more operational value,
but the project has not yet begun, and thus cannot have any significant
impact on Egypt's large inventory of Soviet tanks for a long time to
come.
b. Air Force
Two projects have been discussed with regard to upgrading
the capability of the EAF. Discussions began in 1975 between Egypt and

two British firms on a proposal to equip Egypt's MiG-21's with an im-
proved weapons delivery system. Ferranti, Ltd. was reportedly selected
in learly 1976 to develop the system [Ref. 17, p. 5]; however, no fur-
ther evidence indicates that the system has actually been developed or
flight tested.
Of potentially greater significance was a proposal to re-
engine the MiG-21 force with Rolls Royce SPEY engines. This modifica-
tion would have increased performance and fuel efficiency, simplified
maintenance, and most importantly, prolonged the life of what is
essentially a good, maneuverable interceptor aircraft. The proposal was
found to be technically feasible but too time-consuming and cost-ineffec-
tive for further development, and the project was dropped in early 1976
[Ref. 30, p. 20].
c. Navy
Efforts to upgrade Naval capabilities via retrofit have
centered on improving navigation/target acquisition capability of Egypt's
missile boat forces, and replacing the obsolescent Styx missiles aboard
those boats with a better Western missile. One modification which has
already begun is the fitting of Decca ESM (electronic signals measure-
ment) receivers and series 1200 navigation radars to four of Egypt's
eight Osa class missile boats [Ref. 32, p. 665]. The remaining four
Osa's, the four Komar's, and possible Egypt's six indigenously built
missile boats are expected to be similarly fitted. The same source also
indicated that negotiations were continuing (as of August 1976) for
Marconi Sapphire fire control systems, which could be fitted to the
missile boats in association with an improved missile system.
In the weapons area, advanced negotations were reported in
progress with Oto Melara for at least 30 of the Italian versions of the
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Matra/Oto Melara OTOMAT anti-shipping missile. This missile would re-
place STYX on Egypt's Osa/Komar fleet, and/or be used to arm the six
"Egyptian Komar" class vessels [Ref. 19, p. 907].
d. Prospects for Alternative I
It should be apparent from the preceding discussions that
retrofit of existing Soviet equipment has not had any significant impact
on Egypt's military capability, nor is it likely to in any service ex-
cept the Navy. The Air Eorce and Army programs involve either too many
units or too many technical problems to represent viable equipment im-
provement options. It would appear that these proposals began to surface
as negotiations for direct procurement of new equipment and/or license
production in Egypt of Western equipment bogged down. While it is not
so stated in any source known to this author, these moves may have
represented a desperation attempt on the part of the military to find
some way of arresting the decline in capability of some of their most
important hardware items. As they are apparently going to have little
impact in arresting that decline, success in arms diversification would
appear to lie firmly in the areas of procurement and license production.
2. Alternative II - Direct Procurement of New Equipment
A casual reading of the press and defense-related periodicals
over the past three years would lead one to believe that Egypt had
essentially solved its military problems through the massive purchase
of Western hardware. At various times deals have been reported for the
purchase of 200 Jaguar attack aircraft, 250 Lynx helicopters, 200 Hawk
trainer aircraft, hundreds of Mirage F.l fighter/attack aircraft, and
the like. The author ran across many such proclamations in the course
of this research, only to find that some later article or statement on
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the sane given deal reduced the number of items, denied the deal entire-
ly, or said words to the effect that, yes, Egypt is still interested in
the weapon, but there are many details to be worked out, and no con-
tracts have been signed as yet. Tracing through the web of contradic-
tion and misleading information leads one to the question of why there
is such a disparity between what is announced at one time and what is
agreed upon for delivery at some later, often much later, date. An
article in the London Times (27 March 1976, cited Ref. 14, p. 78-80)
focused on two very logical reasons for this disparity. First, it is
necessary politically for President Sadat to pursue a vast rearmament
policy to assuage the fears of his military leaders that he is letting
the military forces decline in capability to an unacceptable level.
An "agreement in principle" for a large number of aircraft, for example,
can be an effective tool to convince the military leaders that the
President has not in fact abandoned the military option if his diploma-
tic strategy fails to secure Egypt's aims in the Middle East.
The second reason for the disparity is largely economic. Even
if Egypt does in fact desire the large quantities of weapons that have
sometimes been discussed, the money to pay for them simply has not been
there (or at least the prospective suppliers have felt sufficiently
unsure that the money would be there to avoid committing themselves to
large sales ) . Negotiations for a wide variety of weapons were reported
stalled or proceeding with extreme caution because the prospective
European suppliers were uncertain if funds would be available to pay
for them. The slowdown in funds from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
oil states has been attributed to Egypt's mismanagement of funds already
given her [Ref. 33, p. 84] , a more circumspect view of Sadat due to his
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having signed the Second Sinai Agreement in September 1975, and a general
decline in excess cash in the oil states due to lessened worldwide demand
for oil in 1975.
The disparity between what Egypt has sought and what she has
received will become apparent in the following analysis. The first sec-
tion deals with Western weapons which have actually been received in
Egypt or are likely to be received within a few months time. Note that
in some cases these items were ordered in Egypt's behalf by other nations
before the official announcement of the policy of arms diversification
in April 1974. The second section addresses weapons for which contracts
have been signed but delivery is still a long way off, or those for
which negotiations are well advanced but contracts are still unsigned.
For items not yet delivered, an attempt will be made to forecast the
time period during which the desired items can begin to impact on
Egyptian military capability.
a. Weapons Delivered/ Delivery expected prior to 1 July 1977
(1) 38 Mirage III fighter aircraft were delivered in 1974;
originally ordered by Saudi Arabia.
(2) 20 iMirage F.1C fighter-bomber aircraft have probably
been delivered; ordered by Kuwait in late 19 7 3/early 1974.
(3) Six C-130 transport aircraft.
(4) 42 Aerospatiale Gazelle helicopters; armed with
Euromissile HOT wire-guided anti-tank missiles.
(5) 24 Westland Commando helicopters delivered in 1974;
originally ordered by Saudi Arabia.
(6) Six Westland Sea King helicopters.
(7) An undetermined number of vehicle-mounted EAC Swingfire
wire-guided anti-tank missiles were delivered in 1976.
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(8) Several batteries of Thomson-CSF Crotale mobile low-
altitude SAM systems had been delivered as of January 1977.
(9) 200 AMX-30 tanks were reportedly ordered in January
1975; at an assumed production rate of 20-25 per month, the 200 tanks
could have been delivered, but there is no substantiating evidence
that they have been.
(10) Three British Hovercraft Corp. SRN.6 hovercraft were
purchased by Egypt in early 1976, and may have been delivered. This
craft fires the BHC-7 missile. Egyptian crews were trained in England
prior to the purchase.
b. Weapons Currently in Negotiations
(1) Dassault Breguet Mirage F.l Fighter Bomber . Acquisi-
tion of this aircraft has been under discussion since at least late
1974. A January 1975 order was reported for 44 aircraft, to be
delivered in 1979. It was subsequently reported in March 1976 that no
contract had been signed due to uncertainties over funding. Current
negotiations are for Egyptian assembly of 150-200 F.l's, possibly pre-
ceded by delivery of up to 50 completed aircraft. At production of
eight aircraft per month as of mid 1976, it would be early 1978 before
existing orders of 250 for other clients could be filled. Thus, this
aircraft will not likely begin to appear in Egypt until at least mid-
1978. As of January 1977, a contract for Egyptian production was
still months away due to uncertainties over financing.
(2) Dassault Breguet/BAC Jaguar Strike Fighter . This air-
craft seriously entered the Egyptian procurement picture in November
1975 when the U. K. reportedly assured President Sadat that it would
provide Egypt with up to 200 Jaguars. As of October 1976, there was no
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further mention of orders for this aircraft other than 402 for the U.K.
and France, and two export orders totaling 24. Existing contracts for
this aircraft will run until early 1978, preventing its arrival in
Egypt prior to that time even if a contract is signed.
(3) Hawker-Siddeley Hawk Jet Trainer . The Hawk trainer
surfaced in late 1974 as one of the possibilities for production by the
nascent Arab Arms Industry. In late 1975 it was still being evaluated
against the Franco/German Alpha Jet for this production effort (the
Alpha Jet has since fallen into disfavor as a result of the FRG's re-
luctance to sell military hardware to "areas of tension" ) . By February
1976, the negotiations had reverted to proposals for Egypt to buy 100
trainers, and leave the question of license production open. Deliveries
to export clients could begin in 1977, but there is no evidence at
present of any contracts with Egypt. Production is approximately four
aircraft per month.
(4) Aerospatiale SA-342 Gazelle Helicopter . 42 Gazelles
were in the process of delivery to Egypt in early 1977. It was reported
in December 1975 that Gazelle was in competition with the British Lynx
helicopter for a possible order of up to 250. At a production rate of
15 per month, it will be early 1978 before existing orders for Gazelle
are filled (574 as of December 1974).
(5) Westland WG-13 Lynx Helicopter . In early 1974, a poten-
tial order of several hundred Lynx helicopters was under discussion
with the U.K. These negotiations included the possibility of license
production, and U.K. assistance in setting up an Arab Arms Industry.
At one point production of the Lynx was thought to be tied to production
of the Hawk trainer on the same site. As of early 1976, however,
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negotiations over production of this helicopter were bogged down due
to unresolved political and economic issues, and there is no evidence
of a contract for purchase or production of Lynx. Production rate
for this helo is to be ten per month in 1977.
(6) Augusta 109 Helicopter . An agreement in principle was
reportedly reached in mid-1976 between Egypt and Italy to adapt this
helicopter for military use, sell Egypt 100 outright, and start a pro-
duction line. Nothing further has been reported on this deal, and it
is unlikely that any contract has actually been signed.
(7) Matra R550 "Magic" and "Super 530" Air-to-Air Missiles .
Engins Matra, manufacturer of both these missiles, was reportedly
negotiating several missile deals with Egypt in late 1976. The Jaguar
can carry Magic, while the Mirage F.l can be armed with both these
missiles. Little else is known of the status of these negotiations,
but Egypt is expected to acquire these missiles if a deal for the Mirage
F.l is eventually concluded.
( 8
)
BAC Rapier Low Altitude Air Defense Missile . Negotia-
tions on the sale of Rapier commenced in early 197M-, and evaluation
continued at least through November 1975. Rapier has apparently been
abandoned in favor of Crotale for low altitude air defense.
( 9 Aerospatiale Exocet Anti-Shipping Missile . Negotiations
began in 1975 and were reported in an advanced stage as of September
1976. However, funding problems were cited as the cause of delay in
reaching a firm agreement , and Exocet has apparently been abandoned , at
least for the near term, in favor of the Matra/Oto Melara Otomat anti-
shipping missile.
(10) Chieftain Medium Tank . Talks were apparently underway
in early 1976 for the purchase of an undetermined number of these tanks,
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as well as the possible reengining of Egypt's Soviet tanks. No further
information is available on this subject, but the U.K. production line
for this tank is heavily committed to filling a large Iranian order,
and it is unlikely that the Chieftain will make a significant impact on
Egypt's armored forces for at least several years, if ever.
(11) Vosper Thornycroft Tinacity Class Patrol Boats . Egypt
has been negotiating with the manufacturer for the purchase of up to
nine Tinacity class missile boats to replace some of her aging Osa/
Komar fleet. Tinacity is armed with four Otomat missile launchers. The
status of these negotiations is not known.
3. Alternative III - The Arab Arms Industry
Throughout the preceding paragraphs , mention has been made of
prospective deals involving Egyptian license production of various
Western weapons. The idea underlying these arrangements is to use
them as the initial production programs of a new Arab Armaments Indus-
try. The industry would employ Egyptian labor and utilize existing
production facilities at Helwan, Heliopolis, and Cairo. It would be
financed by Saudi Arabian and other Gulf oil money, and make use of
Western technical expertise for initial setup of the various production
programs. Initial emphasis was to be on aircraft production, while
gradually building the capability to manufacture missiles, armored
vehicles, and other items. The development of this Arms Industry in
Egypt would lessen Arab dependence on outside sources for arms, ammuni-
tion, and logistics support items, increase the transfer of sophisti-
cated Western technology to the Arab nations, and perhaps ultimately
enable the Arab nations to begin exporting arms on a limited scale.
Before examining the specific problems related to the establish-
ment of an Arab Arms Industry in Egypt it is instructive to look

briefly at the problems camion to any underdeveloped nation attempting
to set up an indigenous industry for the production of sophisticated
weapons. The problems faced by India, which has had its own defense
production industry since the mid-50's, are considered typical of those
to be faced by any Third World country, and will be used in this illus-
tration (see Ref. 34, p. 723-758 for a more detailed treatment of these
problems )
.
One subset of problems is related to actual production of the
equipment in question. Third World countries generally lack the
financial resources , the appropriate defense-related raw materials
,
a well developed infrastructure of defense-related industries , and the
large pool of highly skilled labor necessary to establish a truly in-
digenous arms production industry. As a result these industries, even
when established, tend to rely heavily on the importation of many of
the components necessary to the manufacture of sophisticated weapons.
These types of problems largely negate one of the alleged advantages
of domestic production, namely the independence it gives a nation from
foreign suppliers of arms. Despite its relatively long history of
defense production, India still must buy large numbers of ships, air-
craft, and tanks abroad, and what she builds herself is still largely
assembled from imported components.
A second problem relates to cost; analysis of India's aircraft
industry has shown that it actually costs India more to produce air-
craft such as the MiG-21 locally than it would to buy the aircraft
outright. Costs are driven up by such things as the greater expense
of importing aircraft parts than whole aircraft, the necessity to use
some facilities outside the country for testing various components of
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the aircraft, and the fact that production rates are likely to be much
lower in the developing country than in the original producer nation.
Political and prestige considerations interacting with the
planning process form a third subset of problems. As a sophisticated
defense industry is regarded as an attibute of power, there has been
a tendency in Third World countries to embark upon ambitious projects
without sufficient prior planning. A case in point is the Indian HF-2M-
supersonic jet fighter project, a high visibility/high prestige under-
taking which dragged on for years before finally ending in failure. In
this project, political considerations outweighed the objective reality
that India simply was not capable of the indigenous manufacture of
such a sophisticated weapon system.
Turning now to the proposed Arab Armaments Industry, in August
1975, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates held
the first formal meeting of the new Arab Military Industrialization
Organization (AMIO) to discuss plans for setting up the industry. The
oil states made an initial capital commitment of 1.04 billion dollars
to the effort. A number of reports in late 1975 indicated that both
the U.K. and France had agreed to supply the technical know-how to
get the industry started; construction plans for revitalizing the old
Egyptian production facilities were reportedly under study, and several
aircraft surfaced as likely or possible initial projects for the
industry - Jaguar, Hawk, Lynx, and Mirage F.l. As with direct procure-
ment, however, plans to establish the Arab Arms Industry have borne
little fruit thus far. At this point, license production of the Mirage
F.l seems the most likely program to start the industry, but as of
January 1977 a contract was still months away. The major snag in this
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contract (and doubtless with the other prospective projects as well)
is the issue of financing by the oil states; as alluded to previously,
these states (the Saudis in particular) have been less free with their
dollars since late 1975 than previously, and the West European nations
are understandably reluctant to make a major investment in Egypt
unless they can be assured of payment.
A second reason for reluctance to invest in Egypt relates to
the potential for further hostilities in the Middle East in the absence
of a ccmprehensive peace agreement. President Sadat's open door econ-
omic policy has largely failed to attract significant Western invest-
ment into Egypt for precisely this reason. Even if the West Europeans
do not fear nationalization of their investments, they are likely to
proceed with extreme caution prior to making major commitments in
Egypt. Widespread rioting in January 1977 probably raised fears in
Europe over the potential instability of the present Egyptian government
(even though Sadat appears to have successfully weathered this crisis),
and this additional factor will likely promote even further caution.
It is clear from the above discussion that any appreciable up-
grading of Egypt's military capability through local production is a
very long-term venture. Egypt is beset by the same problems faced by
India 20 years ago in starting an armaments industry, plus the unique
problems deriving from the potential instability in the Middle East.
Selection of the Mirage E.l as the initial production venture, if it
occurs, represents the same sort of ill-conceived, prestige-oriented
undertaking which has failed in other Third World countries. While the
establishment of an Arab Arms Industry is certainly a desirable goal,
it will clearly not reduce Egypt's military problems for a long time
to come. It thus appears that the only way for Egypt to reverse the
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trend of declining military capability in the relatively near future is
by significant outright procurement of completed weapons/weapon systems.
D. EGYPT'S WEAPONS ACQUISITION EFFORTS: A SUMMATION
This review of Egypt's search for Western weapons leads to the
following general conclusions:
1. In the Army, no significant progress has been made in lessening
the dependence on available Soviet tanks. Procurement of British tanks
seems unlikely, at least in the near future, and proposals to revitalize
the Soviet tanks in the inventory appear ill-considered. Procuring
more French tanks seems the most promising prospect, but there is no
evidence of any deal beyond the original 200. With respect to anti-
tank weapons, some progress has been made in replacing Soviet weapons,
and the prospects for further procurement appear good due to the rela-
tively low cost of these items.
2. In the Air Force, there has been a great deal of talk but rela-
tively little real progress thus far. Mirage F.l fighter aircraft
and Jaguar close air support aircraft in quantity would enable Egypt
to phase out Soviet aircraft in the inventory, but initial deliveries
of these planes, if contracted for, cannot commence until at least mid-
1978, perhaps later (unless, of course, Egypt is given some sort of
preferential treatment, which seems unlikely) . License production is
even further off.
3. The Air Defense Forces have begun to acquire replacements for
the mobile SA-6 low altitude air defense missile system, and further
procurement of either Crotale or Rapier is likely. There is no evidence




4. The Navy has begun to acquire better navigation and ESM equip-
ment, and is apparently on the verge of acquiring a better missile to
replace the Styx. Fire control systems to go with the new missiles are
also under active consideration.
Overall, not a great deal of progress has been made, but if funding
uncertainties can be overcome, Egypt could begin to receive significant
quantities of Western hardware during the mid-1978-1980 timeframe.
Once acquired, Egypt will still face the problems associated with inte-
grating the new weapons into its force structure. Those problems and
their likely impact are the subject of the next chapter.
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IV. THE PROBLEMS OF WEAPONS INTEGRATION
A. INTRODUCTION: THE THREE FACTORS
'
The effective employment of any weapon in combat depends upon three
basic factors. The most fundamental of these is adequate training in
the operation of the weapon. For a relatively simple weapon such as
a rifle or an artillery piece, training involves only teaching the
operator how to load and fire the weapon. As weapons increase in com-
plexity and versatility, an ever increasing premium is placed on
thorough training in all aspects of operating the weapon. This premium
reaches its zenith in the modern fighter/attack aircraft, which is
actually a weapon system. With aircraft the operator must not only
be trained in all aspects of the aircraft's own capabilities, he must
also be well versed in the capabilities of the sensors and weapons
carried aboard the delivery platform. To be able to merely fly the
aircraft to its intended target is of little value if the sensors and
weapons cannot be effectively employed once the target is reached. The
same applies to tank warfare, albeit to a lesser degree; a tank driven
to the battlefield is of little value if the crew cannot effectively
exploit its mobility and firepower.
The second factor which impacts heavily upon the employment of
weapons/weapon systems is the effectiveness of the tactical doctrine
employed. Military commanders must be thoroughly aware of the capa-
bilities and limitations in the various weapons at their disposal in
order to formulate a doctrine which maximizes the strengths and mini-
mizes the weaknesses of their forces. The employment of sound weaponry
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using the wrong doctrine can often lead to disaster. An example of
this is the initial armored counterattack at Qantara by the Israeli
190th Armored Brigade on the second day of the October War. The
Israeli tanks charged ahead as they had done so successfully in previous
wars, and were decimated by dug-in Egyptian infantry using new Soviet
anti-tank weapons [Ref. 35, p. 10-16]. The old and formerly success-
ful doctrine was no longer adequate for the existing situation.
The third factor effecting the successful employment of military
forces is the existence of an adequate logistics support system. This
involves having on hand an adequate supply of spare parts and ammuni-
tion, having an effective means of keeping battlefield units supplied
with these necessities, and development of a corps of personnel trained
in effecting repairs to battle-damaged equipment.
Dr. Ra'anan mentions or alludes to all these factors as part of
his argument that the West cannot ever hope to supplant the USSR as
the main source of arms supplies to Egypt. He seems to come down hardest
on the question of military doctrine, asserting that weapons are manu-
factured for the specific purpose of implementing a particular military
doctrine, and to employ them in some other context is largely counter-
productive. He asserts that Soviet doctrine, with its emphasis on size,
numbers, and relative simplicity of equipment is particularly suited
to Egypt, which is populous but not exceptionally advanced technological-
ly. The implication is that a major shift to Western weapons would re-
quire a fundamental re-education of the Egyptian General Staff in the
employment of a new doctrine to utilize those weapons effectively.
Further, the shift away from Soviet weapons would require a retraining
of personnel which he apparently feels to be beyond the technological
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capability of the Egyptians, given the relatively greater complexity
of the proposed Western arms. For these reasons (as well as the quanti-
tative reasons mentioned earlier) he concludes that a complete substi-
tution of Western for Soviet arms would require a prohibitively long
time, and is not what Sadat has in mind anyway [Ref. 14, p. 58-59],
While the above argument appears to be a powerful one against the
ultimate success of arms diversification on a major scale, the fact
is that it is refuted by Egyptian employment of weapons in the 1973 War,
and by observations of the Egyptian military since the War. Before
addressing these areas it is necessary to examine briefly the doctrine
for which Soviet weapons were designed. Because the Armored Corps and
the Air Force represent two of the most important services wherein
weapons capabilities must be keyed to doctrinal considerations, the
following paragraphs will concentrate on these two areas. The analysis
is taken from a study by Lewis Snider [Ref. 25, p. 29-34].
B. SOVIET DOCTRINAL/WEAPON RELATIONSHIPS
1. Armor
Soviet tanks have been designed for close combat on the open,
flat plains of central Europe. The Soviet doctrinal emphasis is on
massed armored charge and heavy fighting at close quarters; consequently
Soviet tanks have low, rounded turrets to present a minimal target. This
has resulted in the inability to depress their gun barrels more than
four degrees below horizontal; the importance of this characteristic
for desert warfare will be apparent later in this analysis. Soviet
tanks also have smoothbore main guns, limiting their effective anti-
armor range, and ineffective rangefinders compared to Western tanks,
further limiting their accuracy of fire at longer ranges. In the close
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quarters for which they were designed, however, the effects of these
deficiencies are minimized.
2. Aircraft
Soviet emphasis in aircraft construction has appeared to concen-
trate most heavily on single-purpose aircraft designed for the inter-
ceptor/air defense role. This role emphasizes high speed at the
expense of weapons payload and combat radius; for the ground support
role high weapons payload and combat radius are more desirable than
high speed. Even the SU-7, which is classified as a ground support/
attack aircraft, is very much inferior to Western aircraft as regards
these two characteristics. The MiG-23 shows a movement away from the
trend of single-purpose interceptor aircraft, but it does not possess
the degree of multiple capability evident in such Western aircraft as
the F-4 or the F-15. The lack of Soviet emphasis on the close air
support role, due to doctrinal leanings in the direction of intercep-
tion/air defense, has conditioned the capabilities of the aircraft she
has developed.
C. EGYPTIAN EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET WEAPONRY
1. Armor
Soviet tank doctrine in the opening days of the October War
would appear to have called for the engatement of Israeli tanks by
Egyptian tanks at close quarters on the East bank of the Suez Canal.
The tactics used in this phase of the war, however, were not taught by
the Soviets. Egyptian generals pointed out that they had taken what
they believed to be useful from Soviet and other writings, then
adapted their own armored doctrine from there. Realizing that the
Egyptian Army was still inferior to the Israelis in the mobile armored
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warfare setting, Egypt held back its armor after the initial canal
crossing and let its infantry forces deal with advancing Israeli tanks
using anti-tank missiles [Ref. 36, p. 3-11]. This clearly shows the
capability to modify doctrine to suit the circumstances, and is the
more significant because the Egyptians evolved the new tactics them-
selves. When Egypt launched the armored offensive in the Sinai on
14 October, in a more conventional (by Soviet doctrinal standards)
employment of armored forces, the differences in terrain between the
desert and the flat plains of Central Europe exacerbated the in-
adequacies of Soviet armor. The Israelis were able to fire at longer
ranges and from more hull-down positions behind undulations in the
desert terrain due to the superiority of Western tanks for that type
of warfare.
The above summary has pointed up two aspects of the doctrinal
implications for arms diversification. First, Egypt has shown the
capability to use armor in a doctrinal context other than that for
which it was intended, and to use it effectively. Secondly, the more
conventional employment of Soviet armor in the latter stages of the War
pointed up the deficiencies of Soviet doctrine and weapons in the
desert warfare arena; a more suitable tank might have altered the
outcome of the Sinai tank battle significantly.
2. Air Force
The Egyptian Air Force operated under two very serious con-
straints in the October 1973 War. The first of these is the relative
unsuitability of Soviet aircraft for the close air support (CAS) role.
As pointed out previously, most Soviet aircraft possess characteristics
which make them most suitable as fighters or interceptors, even if they
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are nominally classified as attack aircraft. The SU-7 was Egypt's most
capable ground support aircraft, but its capabilities fall far short
of those of such aircraft as the A-4 Skyhawk or the F-4 Phantom.
The second handicap, and a far more serious one, is the inade-
quacy of Soviet pilot training methods, at least as far as the training
of Egyptian pilots was concerned. The shortcomings in this area are
as follows [Ref. 37, p. 15-16]:
a. Once basic flying skills had been taught, there was no
program to refine those skills. Thus, Egyptian pilots did not have the
intimate familiarity with their aircraft that is required for maximum
effectiveness in a combat situation.
b. By Western standards, formal training in air-to-air combat
was extremely limited, and in CAS it was practically non-existent.
This exacerbated the ineffectiveness of the aircraft as CAS platforms.
Training was limited to Soviet set-piece tactics, thus impairing the
capability of pilots to deal with situations where those tactics could
not be used.
c. Flying in peacetime was limited to conserve fuel, and there
was little emphasis on night, overwater, or instrument work.
d. Technical manuals, when provided, were in English or Russian,
neither well understood by Egyptians, and consequently there was little
motivation to become really familiar with the aircraft and their
weapons on one's own time.
Despite these handicaps, the Egyptian Air Force acquitted itself
well in the 1973 War. In its only large-scale ground attack effort on
the opening day of the war, the EAF succeeded in knocking out several
Israeli airfields in the Sinai, and damaging a number of other targets.
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The attacks were made without opposition from the Israeli Air Force,
but the fact remains that the EAF demonstrated the capability to
employ a doctrine for which it had been inadequately trained and for
which its aircraft were less than optimally suited.
For the defensive air battle against the CAS missions of the
Israeli Air Force the EAF developed the tactic of fighting within the
air defense missile belt. While this entailed some risk of shooting
down one's own aircraft with misdirected surface-to-air missiles (SAM's),
in the swirling melee of battle, actual accidents of this nature were
rare, and both EAF and EADF commanders contended that the use of inter-
ceptors and SAM's together in the air defense missile zone was an
operationally sound tactic [Ref. 38, p. 16-18].
The preceding discussion demonstrates that in the area of air
warfare, as well as in armored warfare, the Egyptian Armed Forces were
not constrained by the rigidity of Soviet doctrine; it further demon-
strates their capability to adapt their weapons to the situation and
to make effective use of them, despite the inferiority of their prior
training and of the weapons themselves.
D. THE MAINTENANCE TRAINING PROBLEM
Recall that it has been argued that the greater technological com-
plexity of Western weapons generally will limit the capability of the
Egyptian Armed Forces to operate and maintain these weapons effectively.
The training efforts underway in Egypt as of mid-1975, however, would
appear to refute this assumption. Several sources within the Egyptian
Military have noted that while Soviet equipment is technologically
less sophisticated that comparable Western equipment, it is nevertheless
overly complicated and difficult to maintain. Rear Admiral Hassam Ezzi,
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commander of the Egyptian Armed Forces Technical Institute (AFTI ) , ex-
pressed the view that Egyptians would have little difficulty operating
and maintaining Western equipment [Ref. 39, p. 53]. Similarly, the
deputy commander of the Air Force Technical Training Institute (AFTTI)
anticipated that while Western equipment requires a broader theoretical
background and expanded knowledge of advanced technological concepts,
training on this Western equipment would be easier than on Soviet equip-
ment [Ref. 27, p. 43]. While these two statements must be interpreted
in light of the fact that they were made to visiting editors of Aviation
Week and Space Technology , these editors' observations of programs
underway at the AFTI and the AFTTI confirmed that Egypt is making an
all-out effort to expand the technical competence of its Armed Forces
personnel. The AFTI, which was to be capable of handling 5000 students
when new facilities in Heliopolis were completed in late 1975 , teaches
courses in five areas of weapon system maintenance: aviation maintenance,
rockets and radar (including all SAM systems and associated radar)
,
gunnery, communications, and ground forces equipment. The training
programs were initially guided by the Russians, but the current emphasis
is on national autonomy; there are no foreign advisors at the Institute,
and some of the training programs - notably electronic warfare - have
been formulated entirely by Egyptian officers. Other emphasis at the
school are on repair of battle-damaged equipment and on acquiring a
broad theoretical background in a variety of subjects, followed by
specialized training on the particular system upon which the student
will ultimately work. The shift to Western equipment is not expected
to have much effect on the broad technical curricula at the school since
many of the features of Western technology have already been incorporated
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into the course work. Only the specific systems training will change,
and AFTI instructors were already training in England and France (as
of mid-1975) in preparation for setting up courses in the new systems.
The Ann, with a capacity for 2700 students, is the primary source
of training for Egypt's aircraft mechanics and other non-commissioned
technicians. Like the AFTI, the emphasis is on giving students a
broad theoretical background in the technical areas necessary to main-
tain and repair Western equipment. This broad technological grounding
reflects not only the desire to prepare Egyptian maintenance personnel
for the reception of Western equipment/weapons, but also the dissatis-
faction with the extremely narrow and specialized training provided by
the Soviets. At the Arm , this broad technical grounding is followed
by specialization in either the area of routine maintenance and repair,
or the area of overhaul and major repair. Like the AFTI, the Air Force
Institute makes extensive use of damaged and scrapped equipment to give
its students practical, firsthand knowledge of the systems upon which
they will be working.
The preceding discussion is not meant to imply that there will be
no difficulty in changing over from Soviet to Western weapons. What it
does show is that Egypt is making a concerted effort to train a cadre
of maintenance personnel for all the services; further, by giving the
students a broad theoretical background as opposed to the overly re-
stricted and specialized training given by the Soviets, Egypt's
mechanics and technicians will be better able to repair and maintain
equipment regardless of the source. Visits to the two institutes left
observers with the impression that the students were highly motivated,
thoroughly capable of absorbing the subject matter being taught, and
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very innovative (as demonstrated by the large number of training aids,
for example, which had been developed by the students and their in-
structors) (See Ref. 27, p. 42-47, and Ref. 39, p. 49-53 for further
information on the AFTI and AFTTI.) The overall picture, then, is one
of a nation making a concerted and apparently successful effort to
acquire the technological grounding necessary to cope with Western
technology when it arrives.
E. OPERATOR TRAINING
The second major facet of training which will impact upon the capa-
bility to change over from Soviet to Western arms is that of training
operators of the weapons/weapon systems. Because combat aircraft are
highly complex weapon systems , exist in relatively large numbers , and
will be delivered at relatively slow rates, it will take the Air Force
longer than the other services to complete a major changeover to
Western equipment. For that reason this analysis will lock at the Air
Force with respect to the problems of transitioning operators from one
piece of equipment to another. The same sorts of problems, on a lesser
scale, will exist within all the services.
Egypt has two options she can pursue in making the changeover to
Western aircraft. First, she can train new recruit pilots from the
ground up on the new Western aircraft once they arrive in Egypt. This
option requires ground school, flight training in a succession of piston
and jet powered trainers, assignment to operational training units for
further flight work on a specific aircraft, and finally assignment to
an operational squadron. The final two stages should provide the pilot
with intimate familiarity with the aircraft itself and all of its asso-
ciated sensors, avionics, and weapons capabilities. The training of a
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MiG-21 pilot typically took about two years by Soviet methods, but it
has already been pointed out that those methods were less than optimal.
Training by Western methods takes approximately the same length of time,
but results in pilots much better qualified to fly and fight their air-
craft. The current extent of Egypt's effort to train new pilots on
Western aircraft is not known, but one of the critical items lacking in
the EAF is a modern advanced jet trainer such as the British Hawk.
Some pilots are known to have been in France in 1975 training on Mirage's,
and Egyptian pilots flew Libyan Mirage's during the 1973 War, so there
is at least a small cadre of qualified Mirage pilots within the EAF.
These pilots will probably form the corps of instructors whose duty it
will be to oversee the advanced operational training of Egypt's future
Mirage (or other Western aircraft) pilots.
The second and potentially better approach to this problem, at least
for the short term, will be to transition pilots from Egypt's opera-
tional squadrons directly to the new aircraft as they arrive. This
approach has the advantages that the pilots are already well grounded in
flying skills, have a large number of flight hours in combat aircraft,
and in many cases have operational combat experience. The major areas
requiring re-education will be in the specific layout of the new aircraft,
its particular aerodynamic capabilities and limitations, and the opera-
tion of its sensors, avionics, and weapons. As a rough guideline for
the length of time required to make this transition, the author examined
a U. S. Navy plan for training Greek Air Force pilots on the A-7H attack
aircraft. The underlying assumptions in the plan were that the Greek
trainees be experienced jet pilots with at least 80% English comprehen-
sion level. Based on those assumptions, approximately four and one half
months was allotted for the transitioning. At the end of this time the
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Greek pilots would be fully competent to operate the aircraft under all
conditions of weather and visibility, and to use all of its sensors,
avionics, and weapons in a combat situation.
While this plan is not directly applicable to the transitioning of
Egyptian pilots from Soviet to Western aircraft, this author believes
that an experienced MiG-21 pilot could easily make the transition to
a Mirage or Jaguar within six months. Given adequate flight training
hours, the transition could in many cases be accomplished in a good
deal less time than that. Obviously, transition along these lines on
a large scale cannot commence until the Western aircraft arrive in
Egypt. However, Egypt currently has in its inventory 38 Mirage Ill's
and 20 Mirage F.l's, which have been there since 19 7 U. If the Air
Force has been rotating some of its pilots through these squadrons on
a continuing basis since that time, it is possible that Egypt has a
fairly sizeable cadre of pilots with at least some exposure to the
Western aircraft. These pilots could then move rapidly into the new
aircraft when they arrive in quantities sufficient to form new opera-
tional squadrons, with a niinimal and temporary loss of combat efficiency
during the period immediately following the changeover.
F. LOGISTICS
The third major area where transition to Western weapons and equip-
ment will cause difficulties is in the area of establishing an adequate
logistics support system for the equipment. This entails not only hav-
ing adequate access to supplies of spare parts and ammunition, but the
development of an adequate distribution system to ensure that the right
parts and ammunition are delivered to the squadrons or battalions which
require them. It also entails the development of an effective inventory
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and control system for logistics support items so that critical replace-
ment parts which are in short supply can be identified and reordered
before that supply is exhausted. These problems are difficult to cope
with even in a country which manufactures all of its own military hard-
ware; anyone who has served aboard a United States Navy ship can recount
instances where spare parts to fix a weapon or radar (parts which should
have been on board) were not available and could not be obtained for
periods ranging from days to weeks or even months. These problems can
be exacerbated when a nation's armed forces operate a number of different
kinds of equipment supplied by several different supplier nations. For
Egypt, assuming she eventually begins to acquire significant quantities
of Western aircraft, tanks, missiles, and other equipment, these prob-
lems will be particularly bothersome during the period when she is
phasing in new weapons while still operating some units using the best
of the remaining Soviet hardware.
Even this should not pose an insurmountable problem in Egypt's
quest for arms diversification. In the first place, it has been pointed
out that logistic support with the Soviet Union as the sole supplier was
not exceptionally good; maintenance training was limited, and the
Russians tended to manipulate shipments of spare parts for their own
purposes. In a multiple supplier situation, with each supplier striving
to demonstrate the superiority of its own weapons and logistics support
programs (no doubt with a view toward capturing further sales), the
capability to adequately maintain and overhaul equipment may well be
better than it was under the single source procurement plan.
Secondly, it has been demonstrated that nations can develop very
effective military forces while operating equipment from several
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different suppliers. The primary example of this is Israel. Besides
a variety of Western equipment (British and American tanks, French and
American aircraft, for example), Israel has successfully utilized
captured Soviet tanks, for which she is obviously not on the distribu-
tion list for spare parts. Granting that Israel is more advanced tech-
nologically than Egypt, this example nonetheless demonstrates that a
country can effectively operate armed forces employing weaponry from
several different suppliers.
The capability that Egypt demonstrated in the 1973 War to repair
battle damaged equipment in the field, and the development of a growing
capability to manufacture spare parts for some of her Russian equip-
ment point to a growing awareness in Egypt of the importance of adequate
logistic support, and to an emerging technical capability to implement
that awareness. Should the Arab Arms Industry ever become a reality,
the familiarity with equipment that derives from manufacturing it will
further enhance Egypt's logistics support capability. The chief problem
will be in developing a distribution system to ensure that Mirage squad-
rons get Mirage spare parts and Mirage ordnance. As it appears that
most major weapon systems will be phased into the inventory rather
slowly, due to constraints caused by production rates, this author be-
lieves that Egypt will have the time and the capability to adequately
address and cope with problems of this type.
G. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
The overall impression which should emerge from the foregoing dis-
cussions of the problems of weapons procurement and weapons integration
(the changeover process) is that the problems involved in switching from
Soviet to Western armed military forces are formidable but not
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insurmountable. Given that major Western procurements cannot in most
cases begin prior to mid-1978, and that integration of the new weapons
cannot take place overnight, one is unlikely to see a significant
reversal of the trend in declining Egyptian military capability until
at least 1980-1981. That would likely be entirely acceptable to the
Egyptian military commanders, given their distaste for the Pussians.
were it not for the fact that a state of belligerency still exists be-
tween Egypt and Israel. Too, large shipments of Russian weapons to
neighboring Libya, led by the mercurial Colonel Qaddaffi, are bound to
be causing Egypt's military leaders unease. Thus, while there do not
appear to be any insurmountable technical problems associated with
the changeover to Western arms, political problems may intrude to deny
Sadat the time required to make the large scale changeover. The next
chapter addresses some of these problems.
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V. POLITICAL IMPACTS ON ARMS DIVERSIFICATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The major operative hypothesis of this thesis is that a complete
changeover to a Western-supplied military establishment is within
Egyptian capability, notwithstanding the problems already discussed.
It must be pointed out, however, that the policy of arms diversifica-
tion has been orchestrated by Egypt's present leader, Anwar Sadat.
As long as President Sadat is able to remain in power the policy is
likely to be continued, given Sadat's personal distaste for the
Russians. If continued long enough the policy will succeed and Soviet
influence will be virtually eliminated from Egypt. There are several
key conditions which must continue to apply, however, if this policy
is to have the time to ultimately succeed. These conditions are as
follows
:
1. Prospective procurements of major weapons systems must incur
little or no further delay. It has already been pointed out that major
procurements under discussion at present will not have any significant
impact in Egypt until at least mid-1978. Every delay in procurement,
for whatever reason, simply extends the period of reliance on aging
and ill-maintained Soviet hardware.
2. President Sadat must remain in power; it is conceivable, although
unlikely, that he could be overthrown for reasons unrelated to the
progress of his arms procurement policy.




B. DELAYS IN PROCUREMENT
Continued funding difficulties and/or unwillingness of Western
European nations to sell military hardware are the two principle fac-
tors which could cause further delays in significant procurement of
new weapons. Uncertainties over financing have been cited as the major
stumbling block in several of Egypt's procurement efforts. While the
conservative oil states have shown a reluctance to provide Egypt with
blank checks for either weapon purchases or economic development,
they are not likely to force Egypt into a position of having to return
to the USSR for weapons procurement. Funding problems can and probably
will be worked out, but this may require that Egypt scale down the size
of some of its prospective procurements. Given the anti-Soviet bent
of the conservative oil monarchies, however, it is unlikely that funds
will not be forthcoming in the near future for at least some of the
weapons Egypt desires.
It is also unlikely that West European nations (possibly excluding
West Germany) will prove unwilling to sell to Egypt should funds be
forthcoming. They are and probably will continue to be cautious about
making major investments in Egypt itself in the absence of a comprehen-
sive peace agreement, but the potential arms industry is a long-term
venture anyway; two year's further delay in starting this industry would
have far less impact that two year's additional delay initial deliveries
of advanced combat aircraft. The West European suppliers' desire to
portray themselves as friends of the Arabs suggests strongly that they
will sell weapons to Egypt as soon as they know the money will be
available to pay for them.
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C. PRESIDENT SADAT'S POSITION
President Sadat, with the support: of the military, has orchestrated
Egypt's policy of arms diversification. As long as he retains the
support of the military, it is unlikely that he will be overthrown,
despite the recent erosion of his domestic position. Sadat has by and
large been a popular president, but mounting economic difficulties, a
massive foreign debt, and rising expectations among the Egyptian people
have done much to undermine his domestic position [Ref. 40, p. 21].
As pointed out by Gurr [Ref. 41, p. 185], one of the most basic precon-
ditions of civil strife is relative deprivation; as relative deprivation
increases, so does the potential for widespread civil strife. President
Sadat's opening of the Egyptian economy to the West and his steps toward
political liberalization following the oppression of the Nasser years
have led Egypt's masses to expect a better life than Egypt's economy
is able to provide them; hence, relative deprivation. This feeling is
exacerbated by the sight of Egyptians who have profited by the economic
liberalization policy, and also by the feeling that the oil-rich Arab
states are not doing enough to help Egypt out of its troubles [Ref. 40,
p. 21]. January 1977 rioting over the cutting of subsidies on bread
and cooking gas could have mushroomed into a movement to overthrow Sadat
were it not for the presence of one of the most important mitigating
factors of civil strife, i.e. coercive potential. Coercive potential
refers to the coercive forces of a nation (Army, security forces)
weighted for their degree of loyalty to the regime [Ref. 41, p. 186]
.
The effectiveness of the coercive forces of a state increases linearly
with the degree of loyalty to the regime. In the January 1977 rioting
in Egypt the Army acted swiftly to restore order, and by restoring the
subsidies Sadat apparently emerged with little harm to his position.
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The effectiveness of the Army's intervention to restore order bespeaks
a high degree of loyalty to President Sadat. As long as that loyalty
remains, it is unlikely that Sadat will be overthrown, however shaky
his domestic position may appear to grow.
D. SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY
If financing problems are overcome and Sadat can weather most of
the storms foreseeable on the domestic horizon, then the only thing
which might thwart the policy of arms diversification is growing dis-
satisfaction within the military leadership over the efficacy of that
policy. It would be nice to be able to look at statements made by
Egyptian military leaders and deduce from them at exactly what point
dissatisfaction would result in positive steps to change that policy.
Unfortunately, those leaders are unlikely to say at what point military
capability will have declined sufficiently for them to take action,
and they are also unlikely to present a clear picture of the precise
status of that capability. The analyses presented in previous chapters
has shown clearly that Egypt's military capability is declining, and
that that trend is unlikely to be reversed prior to 1980-1981, assuming
present procurement plans come to fruition in the timeframe expected.
While there have been occasional reports of dissatisfaction within the
military over this trend (Ref. 12, p. 12, for example), there have been
no signs that this dissatisfaction is on the verge of turning into ac-
tion to reverse the trend by other means (such as a return to the Soviet
Union). It is the feeling of most analysts that the military, and the
Army in particular, is still firmly behind Sadat's policy, despite the
difficulties which that policy is causing for military preparedness.
One may infer this loyalty from the swiftness of the Army's action in
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curbing the January 1977 riots in Egypt. In order to assess the pros-
pects for continued military support of Sadat's policy, one must
hypothesize that at present the military is at least nominally satisfied
with current and projected near future conditions, look closely at what
those conditions are, then examine closely a number of possible
scenarios in which those conditions are likely to change. Looking at
the prospective impacts of the various scenarios, and the likelihood of
each of them should give some insight into the prospects for continued
military support of Egypt's arms procurement policy. Since continued
military support is essential to the ultimate success of that policy,
the analysis should give some insight into those prospects as well.
Present military/political conditions existing in the Middle East
are as follows:
1. Egyptian military capability has declined relative to that of
Israel and will continue to do so until at least 1980; reversal of
the trend by that time is contingent upon the near future implementation
of arms deals currently being discussed.
2. The prospects for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference
on the Middle East prior to the end of 1977 are good. Press reports
in early 1977 indicate that all parties are positively motivated to
reconvene the conference before the end of the year.
3. The United States appears to be pursuing an even-handed policy
with respect to the Middle East. While Egyptian leaders do not expect
to receive large amounts of military hardware from the U. S. , the
possibility of some sales above and beyond the six C-130's has not been
flatly rejected; the main point at issue is whether or not certain
weapons can be classified as strictly defensive.
7 o

4. There is a feeling in the Middle East, pushed strongly by
President Sadat, that the United States is capable of arranging a
Middle East settlement if it has the will to do so (see Ref. 42, for
example.
Before discussing possible changes in these conditions and their
effects on military support for Sadat's armaments policy is is neces-
sary to state some underlying assumptions about behavior of the
Egyptian military elite. The most basic assumption of this thesis
is that if this elite becomes too dissatisfied with the state of Egypt's
military capability under the policy of arms diversification it will
take whatever steps it deems necessary to restore a steady flow of
military equipment to Egypt. Reaching this level of dissatisfaction
implies dissatisfaction with Western Europe, inasmuch as that is where
the arms are being sought. As it is extremely unlikely that the U. S.
would even consider supplying such arms as attack aircraft or tanks,
the only other alternative open to the military would be to reinstitute
a military supply relationship with the Soviet Union. If President
Sadat should prove unwilling to do so, it is highly probable that he
would be deposed. It must be reiterated that the Egyptian military
leaders are not overly fond of either the Russians or their equipment.
To depose Sadat in order to return to the Russians for military supply
would be a very grave step, one which would be taken only if the
military felt that:
1. The threat from Israel was increasing while Egyptian capability
to deal with that threat continued to decrease.
2. Significant deliveries of Western arms were being pushed un-
acceptably far into the future; at some point, even given no increase
7?

in the perceived threat from Israel, the military would feel the decline
in capability of Soviet hardware would make it incapable of responding
credibly to any threat (for example, ominous gestures on the part of
Libya's Colonel Qaddaffi). Although the Israeli threat has always been
a prime reason for Arab arms acquisitions, it has also been true that
the Arab states are extremely sensitive to tensions with one another.
For this reason, Egyptian demands for arms, while they might become
less imperative in the presence of a peace agreement with Israel, would
certainly not cease altogether. Indeed, many have written that it is
only the presence of Israel, the common enemy, which has prevented
traditional inter-Arab rivalries from exploding more frequently into
open conflict o In this setting it is difficult to imagine the Egyptian
military sitting idly by while its capabilities dwindled away to
insignificance
.
E. POSSIBLE MIDDLE EAST SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPACT
With present conditions and underlying assumptions about the behavior
of the Egyptian military in mind, the remainder of this chapter will
examine several scenarios which may occur in the Middle East in the next
six to 12 months and assess their impact on the prospects for continued
success in the policy of arms diversification.
1. Failure to Reconvene the Geneva Conference on the Middle East
While all interested parties appear to be strongly motivated
toward reconvening the Geneva Conference before the end of 1977, it is
still possible that it would not be reconvened. Such things as the
failure to resolve the question of the seating of the Palestinian dele-
gation, or a fresh outbreak of Palestinian terrorist activity might
scuttle the conference before it could begin. Regardless of the reason(s)
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for failure to convene the conference, it is likely to be viewed from
the Arab side as another manifestation of Israeli intransigence. This
in turn would have the effects of increasing the perception of the
threat posed by Israel, and also reducing Arab faith in the capability
of the United States to exert pressure on Israel. It might also in-
crease the belief still held by many Arabs that the United States is
not really interested in getting Israel to the conference table.
The impact of this scenario on arms diversification would be
severe. It would likely result in increased calls for a new war in
the Middle East, accompanied by increased military pressure in Egypt
to redress the declining military capabilities problem with all speed.
Under these circumstances, any delays in the prospective Western pro-
curements detailed earlier in this thesis would likely convince the
military that President Sadat had erred in casting his lot so heavily
with the West. Unless steps were taken to expedite some deliveries
of Western hardware, the military would quite probably bring heavy
pressure on the president to take steps to reinstate a larger military
supply relationship with the USSR. It is unlikely that Western pro-
curement efforts would cease altogether, but their efficacy as a means
of redressing Egypt's military capabilities problems within a desired
timeframe would be lessened substantially in a situation where a new
war in the Middle East was being seriously considered.
2. Reconvene the Geneva Conference; Make No Progress
Given that issues standing in the way of convening the Geneva
Conference could be resolved, it is still possible that the conference
could end in total failure to resolve any of the substantive questions
at issue. The conference could fail for any number of reasons given
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the long tradition of animosity existing between the principals; failure
to resolve territorial questions or new outbreaks of Palestinian terror-
ism are only two occurrences which might abort the conference once
it began. As with the issues involved in convening the conference,
President Sadat has banked heavily on the capability of the United States
to ensure that progress is made once the parties are seated at the con-
ference table. An unsuccessful dissolution of the conference would do
much to undermine Sadat's position, not only among other Arab leaders but
also among his own military leaders. Further, as with the issues involved
in convening the conference, failure to make progress would be viewed
from the Arab side as a manifestation of Israeli intransigence and lack
of desire for a change of status quo in the Middle East.
The impact of this scenario would likely be similar to that of
the first scenario discussed, but possibly lessened and pushed farther
back in time. It is unlikely that the Geneva Conference will be recon-
vened prior to the end of 1977. Once it is reconvened, it may take a
considerable time before all parties realize that it is going to fail;
on the other hand, it could fail immediately. Failure is likely to
result in renewed calls for war in the Middle East, but if the confer-
ence drags on for some time before failing Egypt may have had time to
resolve some of the issues standing in the way of Western arms procure-
ments, and their impact on redressing the military capabilities problems
may be more clearly known than it is at present. Nevertheless, since
even under optimum conditions significant Western procurements will not
begin to impact heavily on Egyptian military capability until after mid-
1978, failure of the conference is likely to result in increased military
pressure to reestablish a large scale supply relationship with the USSR.
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3. Reconvene the Geneva Conference; Make Progress
Given the apparent interest of all parties in making progress at
the Geneva Conference this time around, the prospects for making that
progress would have to be considered better than at any time in the past.
What is difficult to gauge is that which would be considered acceptable
progress to both sides. The flavor of the rhetoric emanating from the
Middle East seems to indicate that resolution of Sinai and Golan Heights
territorial issues, an end to the state of belligerency in the Middle
East, and the creation of some sort of Palestinian entity are required
before progress can be adjudged to have been made. The recent announce-
ment of a unified Egyptian/Syrian political command indicates strongly
that Egyptian and Syrian territorial issues must be resolved together;
resolution of one set of issues without the other will probably not
constitute acceptable progress. Similarly, the failure to reach some sort
of working compromise on the issue of a Palestinian entity might mean
unacceptable progress, even if the other issues were resolved. Notwith-
standing the complexity of all the issues involved, a scenario in which
the Geneva Conference is convened and progess is made is a distinct
possibility in 1977.
The impact of even partial success at Geneva on arms diversifi-
cation would be profound. President Sadat's faith in the American con-
nection would be vindicated, the perceived threat posed by Israel would
be lessened, and military pressure on Sadat for a quick fix of the mili-
tary capabilities problem would be lessened as well. An end of the
state of belligerency would have the most profound effect, but even more
limited progress accompanied by an agreement to meet again to continue
discussions would reduce significantly the incentive to return to the

Russians for military hardware. Limited progress would result, at the
very least, in postponement of calls for a new war in the Middle East
(indeed, such calls would clearly be counterproductive under those
circumstances ) , and Egypt ' s military leaders would feel that they could
proceed with arms diversification, as long as the timetable remains
substantially the same as it appears to be at present. Even under this
scenario, substantial new delays in major Western procurement efforts
might erode Egyptian military belief in the efficacy of arms diversifi-
cation; however the impact of those delays would not be nearly as severe
as under either of the first two scenarios presented.
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding three scenarios is
that, in the absence of some sort of progress toward an eventual Middle
East peace settlement in the upcoming round of negotiations, there will
be significant pressure applied by the Egyptian military to end or
modify the policy of arms diversification, with an implied increase in
Soviet influence in Egypt. The importance of the United States role in
the eyes of Egyptians cannot be overstressed. Whatever the true capa-
bility of the United States to exert pressure on Israel, in the eyes
of moderate Arab leaders, and particularly President Sadat, the United
States holds the key to a Middle East settlement. If the conference is
not convened or if it ends in failure, the Arabs will likely perceive
that the United States is satisfied with the status quo in the Middle
East and has abandoned its policy of even-handedness. Should this re-
sult in significant pressure from within the Egyptian military to abandon
the policy of arms diversification, the only apparent alternative open
to the United States would be to offer to sell to Egypt some of the
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hardware she is seeking in Western Europe. Egypt has expressed a
desire for such American weapons as the F-5 aircraft and the TOW anti-
tank missile, and in late 1976 President Sadat expressed the belief
that the United States owed him weapons as a quid pro quo for his
moderation vis a vis the Middle East situation. In the event of
failure to make progress at Geneva in 1977, such sales would help to
redress the declining military capabilities problem, thereby ameliorat-
ing military pressure to return to the Russians, and would also help
to restore Egyptian belief in the even-handedness of the American
approach to the Middle East. However, given the political reality of
the United States relationship with Israel, the prospects for sales
of any weapons with anything approaching an offensive capability must
be considered extremely slim, even if it were argued that such sales
were the only means of preventing the return of a significant Soviet
presence in Egypt. The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion
is that the United States must employ all the diplomatic means at its
disposal to ensure that satisfactory progress is made in the next round
of negotiations at Geneva. The Arabs recognize that the United States
will never abandon Israel, and they are not asking that it do so.
President Sadat, however, feels that his moderate stance on Middle
East issues and his willingness to put distance between himself and the
Russians, even at the risk of his position vis a vis the military, have
gone a long way to establish the necessary preconditions for a Middle
East settlement. Failure to make some progress in that direction would
seriously undermine the faith of all moderate Arab leaders in the United
States position, and would also have serious repercussions with respect
to Egypt's attempt to restructure its military forces around Western
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equipment. That attempt can succeed if Egypt is given time to procure
and integrate Western arms into its force structure; it will have that
time only if Egypt is not subjected to substantial pressure for a new
war in the Middle East.
G. CONCLUSIONS
During the course of this research this author reached a number of
conclusions about the process of arms diversification in general and
its impacts and prospects with respect to Egypt in particular. Many
have been stated or at least implied in the body of this thesis. To
sum up, the major conclusions of this research are as follows:
1. Egypt's overall military capability has been declining since
the end of the War of Ramaden of October 1973. While pre-war and present
weapons inventories appear to be substantially the same, inability to
properly maintain Soviet equipment comprising 90% of the present inven-
tory has resulted in reduced combat effectiveness and the concomitant
decline in overall military capability.
2. Egypt's search for Western weapons is not intended merely to
acquire seme Western technology and a few weapons in certain select
areas, but rather to entirely reequip its armed forces with Western
hardware. The size of the desired acquisitions, the wide range of these
desired acquisitions, and the limited utility of acquiring a few Western
weapons while relying on the Soviet Union for the bulk of its military
support are the factors underlying this conclusion.
3. Egypt should not be hampered by either tactical/doctrinal con-
siderations or the greater technological sophistication of Western
equipment in its quest to reequip its military forces. Egypt has shown
the capability to adapt its weaponry to the prevailing tactical situation
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and has undertaken an ambitious training program which is keyed to many
of the technological concepts required to handle Western equipment
effectively.
4. Transitioning of operators (e.g. pilots) from Soviet to Western
equipment will take time, but can be accomplished gradually due to the
relatively slow pace at which major Western procurements will likely
occur.
5. A substantial reversal of the trend of declining military capa-
bility can be effected by 1980-1981, assuming that deliveries of major
weapon systems such as combat aircraft begin to occur by mid-1978.
Delays in these procurements will result in a lengthened period of de-
cline of military capability.
6. The establishment of an Arab Armaments Industry is not likely
to have a significant impact on Egypt's military capability for a long
time to come, due to the magnitude of the problems facing any Third
World country attempting to establish an indigenous arms production
industry. Retrofit of existing Soviet equipment is at best of only
limited utility in enhancing military capability; Egypt's best means
of redressing its current problems is through outright procurement.
7. In the final analysis, the only factors which could prevent
Egypt from eventually restructuring its forces around Western equipment
are political factors. Calls for a new war in the Middle East, result-
ing from either a failure to reconvene the Geneva Conference or a meet-
ing of the conference followed by hopeless deadlock, would likely re-
sult in substantial pressure from the Egyptian military to reestablish
military supply relationship with the Soviet Union as the most effective
means of redressing Egypt's declining military capability expeditiously.
81

8. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure that Egypt
is not forced to return to the Soviet Union for significant arms
supplies. The U. S. could probably forestall this development (in the
event of the failure of the Geneva Peace Conference) by agreeing to
large scale arms sales to Egypt. As this option is politically unrealis-
tic, the United States must use all of its influences with both Arabs
and Israelis to ensure that at least a beginning is made at Geneva
toward resolving the long-standing problems of the Middle East. This
would help to give Egypt the time she requires to successfully pursue
arms diversification, enhance United States prestige in the Arab world,
and perhaps even influence other nations dependent upon the Soviet
Union for arms supplies to take steps to lessen that dependence.

APPENDIX I
Important operational characteristics of major weapon systems in
the Egyptian inventory or being sought by Egypt.




















Mirage F.1C 267 2.2 8820 All-Weather
Interceptor









280 .8 5600 Basic and
Advanced
Trainer
Close support is a
distinctly secondary
mission




165 NM with full ex-
ternal ordnance load
MiG-2IMF 250 2.1 3300 Fighter/
Light
Strike
MiG-23B 375 2.3 7500 Air Combat
Fighter
MiG-23D 425 1.4 7500 Strike






























162 350 65 troops
140 259 28 troops
Can be armed with a variety
of weapons; Helos for Egypt
carry 4 HOT anti-tank
missiles
Can carry a wide variety of
guns, missiles, etc at
customer request
Can carry up to 8 HOT or TOW
missiles in two external
pods, plus 6-8 reloads
Can carry 4 HOT or TOW
missiles in external pods
Heavy transport helo
Can carry external ordnance
such as rockets; follow-on
to Mi-4






























Adaptable to variety of
ground and air launch
platforms
Tripod ground launch or
adaptable to various light
vehicles
Can be mounted on virtually
any vehicle; portable ver-
sion (Golfswing) for
infantry
Suitable for wide variety
of ground and airborne
platforms
Vehicle and infantry launch
versions; now obsolete
Ground launch and vehicle
mountings available
TABLE D: Anti-ship Missile Characteristics
Missile Max Terminal Remarks
Range Guidance
(KM)
Aerospatiale 42 Active radar High subsonic, low altitude
MM38 Exocet homing flight profile
Matra/Oto 60 Active radar High subsonic, low altitude
Melara homing flight profile; Mk II versi<
Otomat has 100+ KM range






TABLE E: Surface-to-air Missile Characteristics
Missile Range Alt Limits
(M) (M)
Guidance Remarks








































Fully mobile; 4 missiles
per launch vehicle
Fixed system
Normally fixed but can
be mobile
Fully mobile, 3 missiles
per launch vehicle
SA-7 3000- 45-1500 IR homing Portable, shoulderfired

TABLE F: Air-to-air Missile Characteristics





Matra R550 500-6000+ IR homing
"Magic"
AA-2 Atoll 6500 IR homing
AA-7 Apex 27000 IR and radar
versions
AA-8 Aphid 8000 Probable IR
homing
Missile can acquire despite ver-
tical separation of ± 7500 meters;
production to begin in 1977; has




EAF pilots report this missile
has poor seeker lock-on
characteristics
Standard MiG-23 armament
Dogfight missile; possibly derived
from Atoll; MiG-23 armament
TABLE G: Tank Characteristics





The AMX-30 tank has a maximum road range of 5-600 KM, with
a maximum speed of 65 KPH. It has a 105mm main gun which
fires HE and HEAT ammunition. Maximum anti-armor range
is 3000 meters. The tank employs a optical rangefinder.
The Chieftain tank has a maximum road range of 500 KM,
with a maximum speed of 48 KPH. It has exceptionally
accurate, hard-hitting 120mm main gun which fires HESH and
APDS ammunition. Maximum effective anti-armor range is
3000 meters with APDS, 8000 meters with HESH. It employs
a laser rangefinder.
These tanks have a maximum road range of 630 KM, with a
maximum speed of 48 KPH. Main armament is a 100mm smooth-
bore gun firing AP and HEAT ammunition. Maximum effective
anti-armor range is 1000 meters. Armor protection is poor,
and ranging is by visual estimate only.
The T-62 tank has a maximum road range of 480 KM, with a
maximum speed of 55 KPH. It has a 115mm main gun firing
HE, HEAT, and APFSDS ammunition. Maximum effective anti-
armor range is 1500 meters,
metric rangefinder.
The tank employs a stadi-
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Only one of these boats
has been built in the
U.K. Egypt reportedly
desires up to 9, to be
armed with Otomat
missiles
SRN-6 200 50 unk Egypt reportedly bought
Hovercraft 3 in 1976 armed with
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